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Abstract: Digitization has given rise to information system security (ISS) risks since the 
adoption of new technologies (e.g., IoT and multi-cloud environments) has increased 
vulnerabilities to ISS threats. The behavioral ISS literature depicts employees within 
organizations (insiders) as a major information security threat. Previous research 
extensively investigated insiders' intentional ISS misbehaviors. However, a growing 
number of security incidents by non-malicious insiders implies that potential factors 
influencing employees' non-compliance behaviors with information security policies 
(ISPs) are yet to be addressed. To this end, we conduct four (four essays) to understand 
why employees violate ISPs. Two studies investigate factors that lead to non-malicious 
intentional ISP violations. The other two studies explore how and why non-malicious 
unintentional ISP violations occur. Drawing on the person-technology fit model, essay 1 
investigates how employees' interaction with information technology (IT) increases ISS 
vulnerabilities. This essay sheds light on the impact of one understudied aspect of IT use- 
technostress, on employees' non-malicious ISP violation intentions. Essay 2 relies on 
organizational role theory and explains stress resulting from role expectations, including 
intra-role activities (e.g., job tasks) and extra-role activities (e.g., ISS requirements) could 
cause ISP non-compliance behaviors.  To distinguish non-malicious intentional insiders 
from unintentional insiders, Essay 3 employs the dual-system theory to describe the 
mechanism of employees' decision-making process to comply (or not comply) with ISPs 
and aims to investigate the impact of some personality traits like risk-taking behaviors, 
impulsivity, and curiosity on employees' ISS misbehaviors. Finally, to explore unknown 
factors influencing non-compliance behaviors with ISPs (e.g., individual, organizational), 
essay 4 proposes an in-depth qualitative approach to distinguish non-malicious intentional 
and unintentional ISS misbehaviors and identify potential causes rooted in each type of 
misbehavior. Overall, the dissertation highlights the importance of individual differences 
in perceptions of technostress, role stress, and personality traits. Moreover, it differentiates 
the nature of ISP violations based on the intents of employees and challenges the existing 
knowledge and theoretical frameworks regarding insiders' information security behaviors 
at the workplace. In doing so, proposed theoretical models are assessed empirically by 
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Information system security (ISS) is increasingly essential for organizations because security breaches 
are associated with monetary damage and loss of credibility (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, & Raghunathan, 
2004). Despite various strategies that organizations consider to invest heavily in information security 
assets and infrastructure, statistical analyses show that the number of data breaches and the volume of 
exposed records in the US has been increasing in recent years (J. Clement, 2019), mainly rooted in 
human factors (Bellika, Makhlysheva, & Bakkevoll, 2018; IBM Global technology Service, 2014) 
implying that employees are the weakest link in the ISS and are responsible for the majority of breaches.  
Despite past beliefs that outsiders (e.g., hackers) are the main reason for security breaches, insiders or 
internal employees are labeled as the weakest link in cybersecurity as they account for more than 50% 
of security violations reported by Baker et al. (2010) and remain the top source of security incidents 
(Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992a; PWC, 2018). Except for malicious insider threats (Liang, Biros, & 
Luse, 2016), where individuals with harmful intentions deliberately attempt to hack or steal data for 
personal gains, insiders may violate information security policies (ISPs) non-maliciously in two ways: 
intentionally and unintentionally. Non-malicious intentional (NMI) deviant behaviors are defined as 
security violations performed consciously against the organizational ISPs with no malicious intent to 
cause destructions (K. H. Guo, Y. Yuan, N. P. Archer, & C. E. Connelly, 2011a). For example, writing 
down a password or sharing with a colleague, delayed backups, and installing unauthorized software 
are NMI. Non-malicious unintentional violations are those end-users' behaviors performed 
unconsciously and inadvertently without harmful intentions (Ayyagari, 2012). Accidental modification 
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of software, negligence, and ignorance, accidental clicks on phishing emails, and mis-delivery of 
sensitive data are examples of such misbehaviors. CSI Survey and other industry reports on information 
security incidents found that most of the security incidents belong to the non-malicious (intentional and 
unintentional) human behaviors (Bureau, 2013; Identity Theft Resource Center, 2019; Mahmmod Sher-
Jan, 2018; Richard, 2010).  
Scholars have devoted significant efforts to understanding why individuals deviate from best security 
practices or fail to comply with the ISPs (e.g., not locking down a computer while stepping away, 
writing down a password). In ISS literature, several theories have been applied to study employees 
security-related behaviors, such as the theory of planned behavior, deterrence theory, motivation-
protection theory, neutralization theory, and rational choice theory (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 
2010; Cox, 2012; D'arcy & Herath, 2011; D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012; Karjalainen 
& Siponen, 2011; Li, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2010; M. Siponen & A. Vance, 2010; Straub Jr, 1990; 
Warkentin, Johnston, Shropshire, & Barnett, 2016). The purpose of applying these theories (and others) 
is to identify contributed factors or determinants of employees' intentional non-compliance behavior 
with ISPs. They mainly found that attitude, personal norms, ethics, normative beliefs, punishments, 
rewards expectancy, perceived formal and informal risk, self-efficacy, and information security training 
and awareness programs are the key factors determining what degree employees comply with ISP.  
Despite the growing literature, there are some unanswered questions regarding individual differences 
in terms of their perception of stress regarding their role expectations and interactions with different 
types of technology. Furthermore, existing studies have not distinguished non-malicious intentional 
insiders from non-malicious unintentional insiders to provide empirical insights into unintentional 
insiders' motives and root causes. We address the existing research gap in four essays. 
The advent of new technologies like ubiquities technologies, IoT, AI, and information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) has increased vulnerabilities to ISS threats (Liang & Xue, 2009a; 
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Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992b). On the other side, IT use is associated with stress perception in 
individuals known as technostress, which reduces their job-related performance (Tarafdar, Tu, Ragu-
Nathan, & Ragu-Nathan, 2007a).  Given that employees are recognized as a major information security 
threat, it makes sense to investigate how technostress resulting from employees' constant interaction 
with IT influences the likelihood of security incidents. Thus, essay 1 focuses on the impact of 
technostress on employees' non-malicious ISP violations.  
In addition to IT use, studies indicate that stress might be observed due to job role expectations and 
could reduce employee job performance (Igbaria & Siegel, 1992). Since many organizations require 
their employees to perform security-related tasks, employees might perceive some stress rooted in their 
role expectations due to role-ambiguity, role-conflict, and role-overload, known as role-stressors. These 
role-stressors might cause employees to endeavor to perform their role tasks and, in turn, provide 
favorable situations for them to neglect ISP requirements. Therefore, Essay 2 contributes to the 
behavioral information security literature by demonstrating the importance of role-stressors on 
employees' ISP compliance intention.   
In essay 3, the dual system theory (Evans, 2003) was employed to better understand the differences 
between non-malicious intentional and unintentional insiders since individuals' decision-making 
behaviors follow two distinct automatic and rational cognitive systems. Due to the understudied aspect 
of personality traits in the context of ISP violation, we particularly look at employee's risk-taking 
behaviors, impulsivity, and curiosity as they are best described using dual-system theory (Trimpop, 
1994). Hence, Essay 3 provides a theoretical model showing that employees with high risk-taking 
behaviors are more likely to engage in intentional and unintentional non-malicious ISP violations.  
To differentiate contributed factors of non-malicious intentional from unintentional misbehaviors, 
Essay 4 proposes a broader approach to explore the possible factors that determine non-malicious ISP 
violations. An in-depth qualitative study will be conducted to investigate employee security-related 
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behaviors at the workplace to identify what reasons or factors might make employees violate ISPs 
unintentionally. Hence, essay 4 provides a comprehensive framework of the potential individual or 
organizational factors causing non-malicious unintentional ISP violations.  
The four essays will add to the literature in several ways. Essay 1 extends the concept of technostress 
to the context of information security to unfold the negative impact of IT use on employees' non-
malicious intention to violate ISPs. Essay 2 introduces organizational role theory as a theoretical lens 
to investigate how role stressors might be destructive for employee ISP compliance. Essay 3 utilizes 
dual system theory to provide a theoretical explanation and empirical support to highlights the role of 
risk-taking behaviors in enhancing the likelihood of employees' engagement in both intentional and 
unintentional non-malicious ISS misbehaviors. Finally, essay 4 provides a comprehensive framework 
of human and organizational factors to explain why employees are involved in unintentional ISP non-
compliance. Figure 1.1 presents an overview of the dissertation, and Table 1.1 summarizes the research 
questions, theory and methods, and findings of each study. While four essays cover a wide range of 








Table 1.1 Overview of the Dissertation Essays 
 Essay 11 Essay 22 
Title Technostress and its influence on 
employee ISP compliance 
Understanding employee ISP compliance 
from role theory perspective 
Research 
Question 
a) Does technostress increase the 
likelihood of employees' intention to 
violate ISPs? 
b) Does techno-unreliability create 
technostress? 
a) How does role stress relate to 
employee intention to comply with 
ISP, either directly or through 
organizational commitment? 
b) To what extent each type of role 
stress impact employee ISP 
compliance intention? 
Theory Person-Technology Fit  Organizational role theory 
Method Structural Equation Modeling Structural Equation Modeling 
Data Survey Survey 
Findings a) Technostress leads to employees' non-
malicious ISP violation intentions. 
b) Among technostress creators, techno-
complexity, techno-invasion, and 
techno-insecurity incline users to be 
more engaged in ISP non-compliance.  
c) The dimensionality of the technostress 
instrument was extended by adding 
techno-unreliability as a new 
technostress creator.  
a) The stress of role expectations due to 
overload, ambiguity, and conflict 
leads to ISP non-compliance.  
b) Role stress indirectly contributes to 
lowering compliant behaviors 
through organizational commitment. 
c) Of the three, role-conflict 
contributed the most toward 
employee non-compliance intention.  
 Essay 3 Essay 4 
Title Understanding non-malicious intentional 
and unintentional insiders using dual-
system theory: an empirical validation 
 Understanding unintentional 




a) Does employees' risk-taking behavior 
increase ISP violations?  
b) To what extent work-overload and 
security awareness moderate this 
relationship?  
What types of contextual (e.g., individual 
and organizational) factors influence 
employees' non-malicious unintentional 
information security misbehavior? Why? 
Theory Dual-system Theory N/A 
Method Structural Equation Modeling Qualitative Approach  
Data Survey Interview 
Findings a) Employees who have a high 
willingness to take risks in the 
workplace are more likely to violate 
ISPs either intentionally or 
unintentionally. 
b) Risk-taking behaviors mediate the 
relationship between non-malicious 
security misbehaviors and both 
impulsivity and curiosity. 
c) Perceived work-overload and 
information security awareness have 
positive and negative impacts on non-
malicious ISP violations, respectively. 
a) Determinants of non-malicious 
intentional are distinguishable from 
unintentional ISP violations.  
b) The preliminary results showed that 
some organizational and human 
factors provide favorable situations 
for insiders to perform both 
intentional and unintentional 
NISMs, such as risk-propensity and 
a lack of managerial practices (e.g., 
monitoring employee security-
related behaviors).  
                                                          
1 Shadbad, F. N., & Biros, D. (2020). Technostress and its Influence on Employee Information Security Policy 
Compliance. Information Technology & People. DOI: 10.1108/ITP-09-2020-0610 
2 Shadbad, F. N., & Biros, D. (2021). Understanding Employee Information Security Policy Compliance from Role Theory 










The 21st century is an era of complicated, advanced, and innovative information technology (IT) 
that has digitized our personal or professional lives. The advent of new and various types of IT like 
ubiquities technologies, IoT, AI, and information and communication technologies (ICTs) have 
revolutionized the nature of work and business processes (Forman, King, & Lyytinen, 2014). 
Subsequently, organizational effectiveness has been impacted dramatically in terms of productivity 
and employee performance (Bharadwaj, 2000; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003). Nonetheless, scholars 
have discovered a dual nature of IT in which its use may have negative aspects and unintended 
consequences (D’Arcy, Gupta, Tarafdar, & Turel, 2014).  
Along with the impact on effectiveness, digitization has enhanced the risk of information system 
security (ISS) violations since adoption in new technologies (e.g., IoT and multi-cloud 
environments) increases vulnerabilities to ISS threats (Liang & Xue, 2009b; Loch et al., 1992a). IT 
misuse such as email and network abuse is identified as an unintended negative result of reliance 
on IT and one of the leading security threats (D’Arcy et al., 2014). Although organizations employ 
counteraction strategies such as advanced security systems and information security policies (ISPs) 
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002), security breaches are inevitable, and  employees remain the top 
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source of ISS incidents because of ISP violations (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). ISP is defined as 
a set of guidelines and procedures that organizations require employees to follow in order to ensure 
security activities and proper use of organizational information and technology assets (Lowry & 
Moody, 2015). However, not all users comply with ISPs as prescribed (Besnard & Arief, 2004). 
They often rationalize and neutralize their behaviors to disregard ISPs based on a cost-benefit 
analysis of compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; M. T. Siponen & A. Vance, 2010). Although 
countless studies have been devoted to identify contributing factors of non-compliant behaviors, 
further research is needed to explain employee ISP non-compliance. Furthermore, digitization has 
changed the daily work routine and has required employees to be more dependent on IT to 
accomplish tasks. However, using technology can be problematic since dependency on it creates 
stress in employees known as technostress (Tarafdar, Tu, Ragu-Nathan, & Ragu-Nathan, 2007b) 
where users feel that they have less energy, skill, or ability to deal with technology (i.e., feeling 
stressed due to the inability to cope with IT in a healthy manner). Users perceive some level of 
stress and frustration due to the technostress creators, including overload, complexity, invasion, 
uncertainty, and insecurity associated with IT use (Tarafdar et al., 2007b). In other words, using IT 
requires employees to perform more tasks and process more information, to adapt rapid and 
innovative technologies, to be continuously connected to IT, and to feel insecure and uncertain 
because of unfamiliarity and IT changes. Technostress negatively influences employees’ 
performance and results in lower productivity, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and in 
some cases increases their propensity to quit (Ragu-Nathan, Tarafdar, Ragu-Nathan, & Tu, 2008; 
Tarafdar, Tu, & Ragu-Nathan, 2010). 
Nonetheless, the effect of technostress on employee security-related behaviors is an understudied 
concept. Some studies looked at both technostress and employee ISP violations in tandem (D'Arcy, 
Herath, & Shoss, 2014; Hwang & Cha, 2018).  In a few studies, technostress has been extended to 
the context of ISS called security-related technostress where the objective of the study is to study 
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the employees' perceptions of stress caused by ISS requirements, either ISP or security 
technologies, on their security-related behaviors (D'Arcy et al., 2014; Hwang & Cha, 2018). 
Security-related technostress research focuses on the technological aspects of security systems or 
security requirements. For example, users might refuse to comply with ISPs if they found security 
tasks stressful due to complexity or uncertainty. However, the literature on behavioral ISS seems 
to lack consideration of the impact of IT itself on employees’ extra-role activities like ISP 
compliance. 
Since computerization and human-computer interaction (HCI) are the basis of many security 
breaches and the increased risk of security threats (Abu-Musa, 2006; Loch et al., 1992a), the 
concept of technostress and ISS requires attention. In this research, we seek to understand the effect 
of employees’ daily IT usage on their security-related behaviors. To fill the research gap, we 
conducted an empirical study to seek an answer for the following research question: “Does 
technostress increase the likelihood of employees’ intention to violate ISPs?” We posit that a 
combination of technostress creators can put employees in situations where they feel too stressed, 
anxious, and frustrated to cope with technology. Consequently, perceived stress help them 
rationalize their non-compliant behaviors to not expend energy and effort on security tasks and in 
turn, violate ISPs. We also evaluate which aspect of technostress constitutes more effect on user 
insecure behaviors. Furthermore, our study contributes to the technostress literature by proposing 
and statistically assessing a new dimension to the second-order technostress construct. In general, 
the findings of this research illustrates the importance of technostress in the context of ISS, while 
also provides insights for managers to take account of different types of technostress creators.  
2.2 Overview of technostress and research gap 
 
Technostress is a phenomenon introduced by Brod (1984) defining as the perceived stress because 
of using new IT. Individuals feel different levels of stress, depending on their ability to cope with 
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new technology like as  IT self-efficacy and  IT mindfulness and innovativeness (Maier, Laumer, 
Wirth, & Weitzel, 2019; Tarafdar, Pullins, & Ragu‐Nathan, 2015; Yan, Guo, Lee, & Vogel, 2013). 
The stress arising from IT can be understood through the lens of the person-environment fit model 
which denotes that stress is a consequence of a misfit between a person and the environment 
(Ayyagari, Grover, & Purvis, 2011; Cohen, Janicki-Deverts, & Miller, 2007). In other words, an 
imbalance between human and environment attributes results in stress. According to the person-
environment fit theory, people feel stress under two conditions: when the environment does not 
fulfill a person’s expectations and when a person’s ability (e.g., skills, time, knowledge) is less than 
the demands placed by the environment (Edwards, 1996). The former refers to circumstances that 
the values, needs, and desires of individuals are not fulfilled with resources, supplies, and rewards 
available in the environment (Edwards, 1996). For example, an employee who likes to receive a 
promotion but the organization does not provide the opportunity for the achievement. The latter 
explains inequalities between environmental requirements (e.g., role expectations and 
organizational norms) and individual capabilities to meet those requirements (Edwards, 1996). 
Information system research contextualized this theory to the person-technology fit wherein 
technology features can cause a person-technology gap by either needs-supplies or demands-
abilities misfits (Ayyagari et al., 2011). Technological characteristics such as degrees of usefulness, 
complexity, reliability, and pace of change compel users to feel they have a low ability to adapt to 
technology or can create supplies that conflict user values and expectations. Therefore, perceived 
misfit leads to some levels of stress. For example, low perceived usefulness of technology or 
unreliable systems (supplies) cannot fulfill users’ values and expectations (needs). Factors that 
induce stress are called stressors, and stressors related to technology are known as technostress 
creators (Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar et al., 2010). 
Tarafdar et al. (2007b) identified five technostress creators; techno overload, techno-invasion, 
techno-complexity, techno-uncertainty, techno-insecurity. These are first-order factors of the 
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technostress construct. They go on to define the constructs. Techno-overload occurs when users 
work more, longer, and faster due to IT use. Techno-invasion explains situations where a user’s 
personal and professional lives are blurred due to continuous connectivity to the IT. Techno-
complexity refers to circumstances in which a user is inexpert to use the IT and needs to spend time 
and energy to gain knowledge about the IT. Techno-uncertainty relates to users who feel uncertain 
due to the constant change/upgrades of IT. Finally, Techno-insecurity describes situations where a 
user feels he/she may lose his/her job either by computerization of job tasks or having less 
knowledge about the IT compared to others. All these factors impose a misfit via demands-abilities 
or supplies–needs and drive IT users to perceive some levels of stress. Technologies that produce 
extra works have complicated features, or constantly require updates/upgrades, imply high 
demands exceeding users’ ability to simply adopt and execute tasks. Techno-insecurity and techno-
invasion could also set up environments that might be incompatible with user expectations and 
values.  
Individuals’ responses to perceived stress are known as strain. The strain is defined as the outcome 
of stress or response (or react) to the stressors (Cooper, Cooper, Dewe, O'Driscoll, & O'Driscoll, 
2001; Tarafdar et al., 2010) which can be manifested in forms of psychological reactions or 
behaviors (Florkowski, 2019; Tarafdar et al., 2010). The response to technostress results in 
undesirable behavioral and psychological outcomes such as low productivity or task performance, 
discontinued IT use, and low satisfaction (El Halabieh, Beaudry, & Tamblyn, 2017; Lei & Ngai, 
2014; Stich, Tarafdar, Stacey, & Cooper, 2019; Tams, Thatcher, & Grover, 2018). 
Technostress has been studied in different contexts such as NeuroIS, social network sites, 
healthcare, and organizational structure (Maier, Laumer, Weinert, & Weitzel, 2015; Patel, Ryoo, 
& Kettinger, 2012; Pirkkalainen, Salo, Makkonen, & Tarafdar, 2017; Tams, Hill, de Guinea, 
Thatcher, & Grover, 2014). However, in the context of ISS, technostress research lacks sufficient 
understanding, except for some studies that extended the concept of technostress to the domain of 
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ISS known as ISS-related technostress (Brinton Anderson, Vance, Kirwan, Eargle, & Jenkins, 
2016; Chang, Hsu, Li, & Hsu, 2018; D'Arcy et al., 2014; Hwang & Cha, 2018; Singh, Johnston, & 
Thatcher, 2019), which means that ISS requirements such as security systems and ISPs are the 
source of stress and consequently lead to employees insecure behaviors or ISP violations. Some 
research should investigate the direct effect of technostress (due to IT use itself) on employee extra-
role behaviors like ISP compliance. 
2.3 Research model and hypotheses development 
2.3.1 Techno-unreliability: a new dimension of technostress 
 
As described, the five first-order constructs of technostress instrument (techno overload, techno-
invasion, techno-complexity, techno-uncertainty, techno-insecurity) have been frequently used in 
literature. One dimension that seems to be missing is techno-unreliability, which means that due to 
the complexity of technologies, they are not consistent and reliable (Butler & Gray, 2006; Forester 
& Morrison, 1990). System breakdowns, software/hardware failure, speed problems (low response 
time), interrupted Internet connection, and unavailability of online services are common reliability 
problems (Brinton Anderson et al., 2016; Hudiburg, 1995). Systems unreliability leads to 
undesirable outcomes such as social vulnerability (Forester & Morrison, 1990), low IT adoption 
(Wachira & Keengwe, 2011), and most importantly, enhanced stress in users (Ayyagari et al., 2011; 
Califf, Sarker, & Sarker, 2020; Fischer, Pehböck, & Riedl, 2019). For example, a qualitative study 
by Fischer et al. (2019) showed that techno-unreliability interrupts task accomplishments, causes 
work loss (e.g., losing an order via email), and makes users feel angry and unhappy when they 
experience time pressure and are highly dependent on technology. Califf et al. (2020) reported that 
unreliability of health information technology (HIT) prevents nurses from executing their primary 
job like documenting patient data. One example is an intensive care nurse who can’t conduct her 
mandatory charting of records into the electronic records management (ERM) program because the 
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system is down and she must sit on the phone waiting for the IT department while at the same time 
her patients require her attention.  
Recently, scholars called for quantitative investigations into the dimensionality of technostress in 
which the technostress instrument needs to be updated in order to include a new dimension, techno-
unreliability (Fischer et al., 2019; Fischer & Riedl, 2015). Thus, we propose techno-unreliability 
as a new additional first-order construct to the other dimensions and include it in our theoretical 
model to assess the relationship between technostress and other constructs of the study. Following 
the person-technology fit model, we argue that unreliable technologies create environments with 
low resources that do not meet users’ needs and expectations. Thus, the misfit can be a source of 
stress. Despite previous study by Califf et al. (2020) investigated techno-unreliability of HIT 
reduces performance of performing primary job tasks (intra-role), we argue that techno-
unreliability can be a factor that inhibits employees from performing extra-role activities like ISP 
compliant behaviors as employees usually perceive security tasks are external activities and are not 
a part of their job (Albrechtsen, 2007; Xu & Guo, 2019). When individuals struggle to accomplish 
tasks, techno-unreliability can exacerbate the situation thus causing employees to neglect ISPs.   
2.3.2 Technostress and perceived strain 
 
Psychological or behavioral response to stressors is defined as strain (Sarabadani, Carter, & 
Compeau, 2018; Tarafdar et al., 2010). The extant stress literature denotes the positive relationship 
between stressors and strain. Research shows high levels of perceived stressors are highly impactful 
on users’ psychological and emotional reactions (Burke, Brief, & George, 1993; Fisher, Kerr, & 
Cunningham, 2019; Keenan & Newton, 1985; Kinman & Jones, 2005; Richardson, Yang, 
Vandenberg, DeJoy, & Wilson, 2008). Regarding technostress creators, research depicts 
technostress influences individuals’ emotions such as work exhaustion, burnout, techno fatigue, 
techno exhaustion, emotional responses (e.g., deterrence, loss, and achievement emotions), end-
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user satisfaction, and job satisfaction (Gaudioso, Turel, & Galimberti, 2017; Ioannou & 
Papazafeiropoulou, 2017; Sarabadani, Compeau, & Carter, 2020; Turel & Gaudioso, 2018).  
We follow the psychological aspect of strain (i.e.,  the extent to which the user feels tired, drained, 
or burned out due to IT usage) similar to the study by Ayyagari et al. (2011). Corresponding to the 
past research on the positive impact of technostress on the perceived strain, we hypothesize that 
there is a positive relationship between technostress and strain with one difference. We extended 
the technostress instrument by adding techno-unreliability to the second-order technostress 
construct, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied in the technostress literature. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1: Technostress is positively related to perceived strain. 
2.3.3 Perceived strain and violations of ISPs 
 
Research has shown that strain influences users behaviors, and it leads to adverse behavioral 
outcomes such as substance abuse (Osborne, 2019), low academic performance (Cao, Masood, 
Luqman, & Ali, 2018; Yu, Shi, & Cao, 2019), physical issues and reduced job effectiveness (Wang, 
Tan, & Li, 2020), lower work performance and productivity (Chen & Karahanna, 2018). There is 
also evidence that explains strain makes individuals engage in criminal behaviors (Agnew, 1992). 
According to Singh et al. (2019), employees who are monitored at work perceive high levels of 
strain and, in turn, are more likely to involve in ISP non-compliance behaviors. Also, previous 
research found the negative effects of workplace stress and information security complexity, 
uncertainty, and overload are associated with employees’ ISP violations (D'Arcy et al., 2014; 
D'Arcy & Lowry, 2019; Hwang & Cha, 2018). Hence, we argue that employees with high levels 
of perceived strain (tiredness and feeling burnout) due to high HCI are more likely to engage in ISP 
violations for two reasons. First, stressed-out individuals experience cognitive fatigue and exhibit 
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low performance through the diminished conscious cognitive process (Brinton Anderson et al., 
2016; Sellberg & Susi, 2014) and become more likely to commit a misbehavior ( e.g., sending 
information to a wrong recipient, clicking on a phishing link). Second, engagement in extra-role 
activities requires additional time and effort. Stressed out employees are too exhausted to give 
priority to security tasks through a cost-benefit analysis of compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  
Hence, we hypothesize:  
 H2: Perceived strain is positively related to the intention to violate ISPs.   
2.3.4 Technostress and violations of ISPs 
 
In prior sections, we explained stressors relate to both psychological and behavioral strain 
(Sarabadani et al., 2018; Tarafdar et al., 2010), and we discussed the relationship between 
technostress and psychological aspects of strain in Hypotheses 1. Here, we argue that technostress 
can have an impact on the behavioral aspect of strain in terms of security-related behaviors, in 
particular, ISP violations. Previous research has extensively examined the inverse relationship 
between technostress and behavioral outcomes such as performance, productivity, IT usage, 
perception of health behavior, and job turnover (El Halabieh et al., 2017; Patel et al., 2012; Tams 
et al., 2018; Tu, Wang, & Shu, 2005). Corresponding to those negative outcomes resulting from 
technostress, we postulate that technostress can result in ISP violations. This can happen in many 
ways.  
First, users who perceive some levels of complexity with technologies inherently feel incompetent 
and need to spend more time and energy to learn how to use the technology. Subsequently, they 
may ignore ISPs in order to solve techno-complexity issues. Second, techno-uncertainty occurs due 
to the frequent upgrades and use of innovative technologies. Adopting/upgrading new technologies 
can be frustrating because employees may need to experience a different particular system. The 
unfamiliarity with the features of new IT and acceptable use policy may threaten ISS. Third, techno-
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overload and techno-unreliability indicate users may prioritize primary tasks over ISP activities. 
While employees use ICTs, it may be perceived as extra work processes. Users may need to perform 
more tasks, work faster, and receive more information by running multiple applications at the same 
time, which can enhance the level of stress in users to accomplish tasks. Similarly, unreliable IT 
causes interruptions and requires users to tackle system problems. Both circumstances cause 
systems to be vulnerable to ISS threats since the main focus of users is on performing primary 
tasks. Forth, stress through techno-invasion can be better perceived as employees constantly use 
ICTs to be reachable. This suggests that they become highly dependent on technology, mainly to 
use personal devices (PC or phones) in order to respond to emails and conduct required work 
processes. This can enhance vulnerability to ISS threats as using personal devices for work 
purposes is recognized as a widespread security threat (Niehaves, Köffer, & Ortbach, 2012), where 
employees are more likely to ignore ensuring the updated security software on personal devices 
(e.g., antivirus). Finally, techno-insecurity can reduce employees’ intention to comply with ISPs. 
Due to the high IT dependency, employees may feel stressed and uncertain about keeping their jobs 
because of either not coping with new evolved applications or being substituted by automatization. 
Consequently, the instability of the work environment makes employees devote less effort 
regarding the organizational ISPs. 
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that technostress influences employees’ intention 
to violate ISPs positively.   
H3: Technostress is positively related to the intention to violate ISPs. 
The literature follows the stressors-strain-outcome framework to investigate the effect of stress on 
individuals’ behaviors or emotions (Choi, Kim, Lee, & Lee, 2014; Gaudioso et al., 2017; Islam et 
al., 2018; Yu et al., 2019). According to this framework, perceived strain mediates the relationship 
between stressors and particular outcomes, meaning that stressors make individuals perceive strain, 
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which in turn, results in behavioral outcomes. Drawing on this framework, we hypothesize that 
technostress makes users feel too drained and exhausted about using technology to spend additional 
time and energy on ISS requirements (i.e., cost-benefit analysis of compliance). As a result, they 
are more likely to engage in non-secure behaviors and violate ISPs. Thus, we hypothesize:  
H4: The influence of technostress on the intention to violate ISPs is mediated by perceived strain.   
Figure 2.1 depicts our research model, describing technostress increases employee intention to 
violate ISPs either directly or through the strain as a mediator.   
 
 
Figure 2.1 Research Model 
 
2.4 Research Method 
2.4.1 Sample and measures  
 
We assessed the research model empirically using a sample of employees who had technology-
based profession. We used the screening method to ensure our sample of participants perform their 
job tasks using any types of technologies listed in Table 2.1, such as desktop computers, laptop, 
tablet, or smart appliances. Data was collected from a crowdsourcing marketing research company 
located in the United States, which distributes online surveys among participants who are qualified 
for the study. The marketing research company distributed the survey among their panel members 
and volunteer employees chose to take the survey. This platform allows for collecting anonymous 
responses and ensuring a heterogeneous sample, covering organizational differences from a wide 
range of industries and job positions. After completing the survey, respondents received a small 
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monetary reward for providing a complete and honest response. Fifty-four responses were 
eliminated due to incompleteness or failure to answer attention check questions. We obtained 356 
responses for our data analysis with diversity in levels of education, age, gender, and technology 
use (see Table 2.1).   
To measure the research model constructs, respondents received a set of questions designed to 
measure technostress creators and strain (See Appendix, Table 2.A). The technostress construct 
was measured as a second-order construct reflecting on techno-overload, techno-invasion, techno-
complexity, techno-insecurity, and techno-uncertainty, where each construct was measured using 
validated items adapted from Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008).To measure techno-unreliability, we 
reviewed the literature to use the concept of technology unreliability (Fischer et al., 2019; 
Hudiburg, 1995). We closely followed the definition of the construct to develop a four-item scale 
reflecting system breakdown, system speed, and instability of the Internet. We also added a 3-item 
tech-reliability scale used in Ayyagari et al. (2011) (although they were removed from the analyses 
due to the low item validity and reliability). The items for the strain construct were based on Moore 
(2000). All items were adapted from the well-established scales and our results (discussed in the 
later section) indicate to the validity and reliability of our selected items. 
2.4.2 Scenarios  
 
We used a hypothetical scenario approach to measure the dependent variable of our model, 
intention to violate ISPs. Scenarios provide subjects with a written description of a real situation 
and ask respondents for the likelihood of their intention of performing a specific behavior if they 
were in such a situation (Trevino, 1992). Scenario method offers several advantages for studying 
undesirable behaviors in terms of indirect measuring of user intention to commit unethical 




Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Survey Respondents (N=356) 
Employment Status Industry Gender 
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Daily technology Usage at the Workplace Years of Work Experience 
 < 3 hours 
3-6 hours 
> 6 hours 
24 (6.7 %) 
136 (38.2%) 
196 (55.1%) 
 < 2 years 
2-5 years 
5-10 years 





Technologies used for work purposes * 
 Desktop Computer   
Wearable and smart Appliances 
Computer Tablet 













* Note that the sum is not equal to 356 because each person uses more than one device.  
 
with present perceptions (M. T. Siponen & A. Vance, 2010). We adapted five scenarios as common 
ISP violations, including password sharing, password writes down, failure to log-off, USB copy, 
and data leakage based on ISS field surveys and previous research (D'Arcy et al., 2014; M. T. 
Siponen & A. Vance, 2010). Moreover, we conducted interviews with three ISS practitioners (chief 
information security officer and information security analyst) who suggested another critical 
security issue: click on links without verification of the source. We developed an original ISP 
violation scenario describing clicking on unknown links. Ultimately, respondents received one of 
the six randomly selected scenarios. (See Appendix, Table 2.B). We measured intention to violate 
ISP using two items adapted from D'Arcy et al. (2014), asking for the likelihood of performing a 
particular behavior similar to the actor in the scenario. We also asked respondents to rate the realism 
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of each scenario ranged from 1 (highly unrealistic) to 7 (highly realistic). The average realism score 
for each scenario was at least 5.35, which ensures scenarios were reasonably realistic.  
2.5 Results 
We used Mplus as the primary statistical tool to assess the measurement and structural models in 
our study (Muthén & Muthén, 2016). While there are other good software tools such as AMOS and 
Stata and each have their strengths, we opted for Mplus as it is a commonly used statistical tool in 
the field of social sciences with more flexibility to conduct various models with latent variables 
(Chang, Gardiner, Houang, & Yu, 2020). We conducted a covariance-based method, structural 
equation modeling (SEM), to analyze constructs and the relationships as it is better suited for model 
assessment, including second-order constructs (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Jarvis, 2005).  
 2.5.1 Measurement model 
We conducted various tests to validate the psychometric properties of the measurement model 
based on model fit, composite reliability, convergent, and discriminant validity of the constructs 
(D. Barclay, C. Higgins, & R. Thompson, 1995). First, following a two-stage approach to testing 
the secondo-order construct (Becker, Klein, & Wetzels, 2012), we conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) on the entire set of items where each observed variable restricted to load on its first 
order construct. Then, we ran a CFA for a model considering second-order technostress construct 
with and without techno-unreliability construct to verify techno- unreliability as a new dimension 
(Table 2.2).  
Table 02.2 Goodness of Fit for the Measurement and structural model 
Goodness of fit measures χ2 (d.f.) CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Good model fit ranges Non-sign. > 0.90 < 0.1 < 0.1 
CFA model (first-order constructs) 863.63 (377) 0.93 0.06 0.056 
CFA model (second-order TSC without 
techno-unreliability)  
837.05 (291) 0.91 0.073 0.08 
CFA model (second-order TS including 
techno-unreliability) 
1042.55 (396) 0.91 0.068 0.08 
TSC, technostress construct 
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First, we performed a chi-square difference test to compare two models. The results showed two 
models are significantly different (2 (105) = 205, P < 0.001) with an improvement in fit index 
(RMSEA). Second, results of R-square determined the variance of the first order factor explained 
by the second order factor construct wherein techno-unreliability accounts for 6% variance of 
technostress construct. Furthermore, according to MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Podsakoff (2011),  
we computed the sum of the squared loadings of the primary factors on the second order 
technostress construct. The overall variance of 2.37 with the five factors (techno-overload=0.76, 
techno- invasion= 0.92, techno- complexity= 0.59, techno- insecurity= 0.71, and techno-
uncertainty= 0.31) increased to 2.76 with six factors including techno-unreliability (techno-
overload=0.64, techno- invasion= 0.75, techno- complexity= 0.85, techno- insecurity= 0.98, and 
techno-uncertainty= 0.15, and techno-unreliability= 0.25). This suggests that the overall variance 
for the technostress construct improved by approximately 16.2% with the inclusion of techno-
unreliability. Third, according to the results of Table 2.2, the second-order factor model including 
techno-unreliability compared to the first-order factor model has more degrees of freedom and 
fewer parameters to be estimated. This suggests that the second-order factor model with techno-
unreliability should be accepted as it is a more parsimonious model (Grover, Teng, & Fiedler, 2002; 
Wright, Campbell, Thatcher, & Roberts, 2012). Finally, loading of techno-unreliability along with 
other second-order factor loadings were highly significant (see Figure 2.2), providing support for 
the second-order model with techno-unreliability (Tippins & Sohi, 2003). Thus, techno-
unreliability is confirmed to be a new reflective construct to the second-order technostress 
construct. Overall, the results of fit indices reported in Table 2.2 (CFI, RMSEA, SRMR) suggested 
that the data fit the models well based on the recommended fit measures for CFI > 0.90, RMSEA 
< 0.10, and SRMR < 0.10 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 1998; Kline, 2015). 
To ensure indicator reliability, we checked items’ loading in which all showed high-factor loadings 
above the recommended minimum value of 0.60, indicating each latent variable accounts for at  
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Table 2.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Statistics  
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TO, techno-overload; TI, techno-invasion; TC, techno-complexity; TS, techno-insecurity; TU, techno-
uncertainty; TR, techno-unreliability; S, strain; INT, intention to violate ISP; α, Cronbach’s alpha 
 
 
least 50% of the variance of the underlying construct (Chin, 1998). To examine construct reliability, 
we calculated the average variance explained (AVE), composite reliability (CR), and Cronbach’s 
alpha (α) reliability for each construct which all fulfilled based on the recommended values of 0.50 
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for AVE and 0.70 for CR and α (Chin, 1998; Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). Furthermore, the 
discriminant validity of each construct was verified by comparing the square root of the AVE  to 
the inter-construct correlation coefficients (see Table 2.3 & 2.4) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981b). We 
also note that the means scores depicted in Table 2.4 provide some indication that all of the techno-
stressors are of concern to our respondents with techno-uncertainty and techno-unreliability being 
their greatest concerns.  Techno-complexity and techno-insecurity were not as concerning as the 
other stressors while strain appeared to be only of slight concern for them. 
Finally, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test to analyze the effect of common method variance 
(CMV) (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), where the sign for CMV is the 
emergence of a single factor accounting for the majority of the variance. The result showed that 
27.46% of the variance in all variables was explained by a single factor (less than 50%). 
Furthermore, following Paul A. Pavlou, Huigang Liang, and Yajiong Xue (2007), a correlation 
matrix between constructs did not show a high correlation among constructs (r2 > 0.90). This 
provides additional support that CMV is not an issue in our study.  
 
 Table 2.4 latent variable statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
CR AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 TO 3.77 1.77 0.87 0.57 0.76        
2 TI 3.27 1.84 0.82 0.53 0.69 0.73       
3 TC 2.65 1.6 0.85 0.59 0.46 0.57 0.77      
4 TS 2.64 1.6 0.82 0.54 0.58 0.70 0.87 0.73     
5 TU 5.1 1.41 0.88 0.70 0.33 0.30 -0.05# 0.09# 0.84    
6 TR 4.6 1.78 0.87 0.63 0.34 0.28 0.17 0.18 0.31 0.79   
7 S 2.9 1.75 0.95 0.82 0.57 0.51 0.69 0.72 0.06# 0.27 0.90  
8 INT 2.58 1.9 0.93 0.88 0.04# 0.17 0.28 0.22 -0.12 -0.002 0.15 0.94 
# P>0.1, The diagonal entries are the square root of AVE.  
TO, techno-overload; TI, techno-invasion; TC, techno-complexity; TS, techno-insecurity; TU, techno-
uncertainty; TR, techno-unreliability; S, strain; INT, intention to violate ISP; CR, composite reliability; AVE, 






2.5.2 Structural model 
Next, we used SEM to test the hypothesized model. We modeled the six sub-dimensions into a 
second-order construct, technostress and related to the other constructs. Table 2.5 presents the fit 
indices and standardized path coefficients for the hypothesized relationships. According to Byrne 
(2013), with a good model fit and meaningful path coefficients, the structural model can be assessed 
by adding a new path as long as the chi-square difference test provides significant statistics, 
implying the second model with one added path is different and meaningful than the previous 
model. Taking this approach, in the first model, we examined the relationship between technostress 
and strain (Model 1). All fit measures indicated a good fit, and the significant path coefficient 
suggested that Technostress is positively related to strain. (β= 0.77, P <0.001). Thus, H1 is 
supported. To examine H2, we added strain and intention to the violate ISPs relationship. Because 
each participant received a random scenario, to test the effect of strain on the intention to ISP 
violation, we controlled for  
the effect of scenario type. The reason was based on the results of a one-way ANOVA test where 
we found the level of intention significantly depends on the type of the scenario (reported intention 
to the sharing password scenario had the highest average of 3.42, followed by a click on links with 
the minimum average at 2.31). We also controlled for realism as we found the perception of 
scenario realism is significantly related to intention. Model 2 exhibited a good model fit and the 
chi-square difference test with Model 1 was significant (2 (58) = 131, P < 0.001). The positive 
path coefficient (β= 0.18, P <0.001) of the strain and intention to violate ISP relationship provided 
support for the H2.  
Finally, in a combined model, we examined the relationship between technostress and intention to 
violate ISP (model 3). Model 3 exhibited a reasonable fit and significantly differed from model 2 
(2 (1) = 12, P < 0.001). The positive, direct relationship between technostress and intention to 
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violate ISPs (β= 0.34, P <0.001) provided support for H3. However, the relationship between strain 
and intention to violate ISP is not significant (β= -0.08, P>0.05). As such, the mediation effect was 
not observed based on Baron and Kenny (1986). Also, we conducted a Sobel test for the indirect 
effect of technostress on ISP violation intention through strain using Preacher’s online Sobel test 
calculator (http://quantpsy.org/sobel/sobel.htm). The Sobel test statistics were not significant (Z= -
0.88, p > 0.05). and H4 is not supported. 
Figure 2.2 depicts standardized path coefficients, significance levels, and a statistical measure of 
R²- coefficient of determination of the combined model. Given the minimum 10% criterion for the 
R² value of a dependent variable to make meaningful interpretation (Falk & Miller, 1992), our 
theoretical model demonstrated sufficient explanatory power (R²= 0.14). 
Table 02.5 Standardized Path Coefficients and Fit Indices for the Structural Models 
Model fit statistics 
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Hypotheses Test H1 was supported H2 was supported H3 was supported 
H4 was not 
supported 
TO, techno-overload; TI, techno-invasion; TC, techno-complexity; TS, techno-insecurity; TU, techno-
uncertainty; TR, techno-unreliability; S, strain; INT, intention to violate ISP; TSC, technostress construct; 





Figure 2. 2 Research Model Showing Results of SEM analysis 
*p <0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p <0.001 
 
2.5.3 Post hoc analysis 
Our post hoc analysis focuses on the direct effect of each factor of technostress on intention to ISP 
violations. Initially, we treated technostress as a combination of six stressors and studied its effect 
on users’ behavioral intentions. However, each of the techno-stressors might exhibit different 
impacts which suggests some more influential to users’ insecure behaviors than others. Therefore, 
we decomposed the relationship between technostress and intention to violate ISPs into six separate 
relationships. We regressed ISP violation intention on each stressor independently to address the 
multicollinearity problem which appears when multiple constructs are used to predict one variable 
(Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner, 2004; Kaplan, 1994). The standardized path coefficients for all 
stressors were significant except for techno-overload and techno-unreliability (See Figure 2.3). We 
interpret the results to emphasize on the role of techno-complexity, techno-insecurity, and techno-
invasion in enhancing employee intention to violate ISPs. Surprisingly, the effect of techno-
uncertainty on ISP violation intention is negative. One can infer that a user with perceptions of 
uncertainty and ambiguity in technology is more likely to be aware of security risks and may take 
precautions regarding information security practices. Techno-overload and techno-unreliability did 
not influence user intention to violate ISPs. Nonetheless, the effect of techno-overload became 






Figure 2.3 Results of post hoc analysis, standardized path coefficient (R2) 
*p <0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p <0.001 
 
presence of an indirect effect or a causal confounder since techno-unreliability causes techno-
overload (β= 0.34, P< 0.001). One interpretation is that techno-unreliability leads to perceptions of 
greater techno-overload which in turn contributes to higher ISP violations.  
2.6 Discussion and contributions  
Although the value of IT is very apparent for organization performance, due to the dual nature of 
IT, overuse of technology and ICTs may give rise to unintended consequences like technostress. 
This study attempted to understand technostress’s impact on organizational information security. 
Technostress is a phenomenon that influences employees’ ISS-related behaviors. We demonstrated 
that users who perceive high levels of technostress are more likely to violate ISPs and threaten 
organizations’ information security. More specifically, our results make several contributions to 
the literature.  
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First, previous technostress literature treated technostress as a second-order construct consisted of 
five stressors: techno-overload, techno-complexity, techno-uncertainty, techno- invasion, and 
techno-insecurity (Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar et al., 2007b). Recently, scholars called for 
the addition of a new dimension, techno-unreliability to the technostress instrument (Califf et al., 
2020; Fischer et al., 2019).  In this research, we extended the dimensionality of the technostress 
instrument to six factors by including techno-unreliability as a new stressor and confirmed its 
psychometric properties. While existing five stressors successfully determine some level of 
technostress, we posited that techno-unreliability should be considered as an additional techno-
stressor. Furthermore, we assessed the relationship between technostress (including new 
dimension) and its psychological outcome-strain. We provided additional support to the past 
research for the positive impact of technostress on strain with highlighting the role of techno-
unreliability in enhancing perceived strain. In fact, we demonstrated a combination of six techno-
stressors causes users incur to exhaustion and burnout due to considerable IT use. 
Second, we extended technostress literature to the context of ISS. Previous literature on ISS 
explored the effect of security-related stressors on users’ ISP compliance behaviors (D'Arcy et al., 
2014; Ho-Jin & Cho, 2016). They specifically examined three stressors: overload, uncertainty, and 
complexity. However, we filled the gap and generalized security-related stressors to the concept of 
technostress, where technostress includes using any type of technology. We found it is not only ISS 
requirements (ISPs and security systems) that act as stressors to make users engage in insecure 
behaviors. In reality, as we hypothesized, features of ICTs and other information systems create 
situations where employees perceive high levels of techno-overload, techno-insecurity, techno-
complexity, techno-uncertainty, techno-unreliability, and techno-invasion. A combination of these 
stressors provides a favorable environment for employees to pay less attention to their extra role 
tasks (ISS requirements) and violate ISPs.  Simply put, technostress does lead to intention to violate 
ISPs. This finding emphasizes on the importance of technostress on user behaviors. While past 
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research depicted the negative impact of technostress on user productivity and performance (Tams 
et al., 2018; Tarafdar et al., 2007b), we contributed further by examining its influence on user 
security-related behaviors.  
Third, previous contributions from stress and IS revealed that strain leads to criminal behaviors and 
adverse outcomes (Agnew, 1992; Singh et al., 2019). We extended the concept of strain to the 
context of ISS. We found employees who perceive high exhaustion and drained are often non-
compliant with ISPs and have higher intentions to violate ISPs. This might happen through either 
diminished mental process for a cognitive fatigue user or prioritization of primary tasks to the ISS 
requirements. However, strain loses its impact once technostress presents. Contrary to the research 
by Gaudioso et al. (2017) and Islam et al. (2018), our results of mediation analysis showed strain 
does not mediate the relationship between technostress and an outcome- intention to violate ISPs, 
suggesting that it is not the perception of exhaustion and burnout (of IT use) that make users violate 
ISPs. Instead, technostress itself is strong enough to impact users’ intention to not comply with 
ISPs directly. Each of the six techno-stressors creates situations for ISP non-compliant behaviors, 
which increase system vulnerabilities to ISS threats.  Thus, a more parsimonious model may be 
sufficient to study the effects of techno-stress on the intention to violate ISPs.  
Forth, in addition to being consistent with past research that treats technostress as a second-order 
factor on user behavior (Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar et al., 2007b), we took a new approach 
and decomposed the technostress construct to its six sub-dimensions to understand which techno-
stressors act stronger in influencing users’ security-related behavior. The results of our post hoc 
analysis revealed that techno-complexity, techno-invasion, techno-insecurity, incline users to be 
more engaged in non-compliant behaviors with ISPs. Among these factors, techno complexity 
appears to have the highest negative impact on user ISP compliance. The more the system is 
complex, the less a user follows good security practices since s/he may be involved to solve 
complicated features of a system rather than following ISP requirements. Techno-insecurity implies 
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an employee perceives some levels of instability at the workplace. Hence, it may result in low 
organizational commitment which in turn reduces intention to perform best ISS practices (Hwang 
& Cha, 2018). Techno-invasion suggests that a user is already exhausted enough of not being free 
of technology; then may pay less attentions to ISS requirements where s/he is required to be 
responsive anytime. Finally, our findings indicated that techno-overload only at the presence of 
techno-unreliability can lead to ISP violations. In other words, techno-unreliability adds to techno-
overload perceived by users. This is consistent with prior findings by Ayyagari et al. (2011), who 
found the more technology reliability, the less the perceived work overload. We surmise that 
additional tasks levied on the user by techno-unreliability (i.e. having to call the help desk, finding 
workarounds) simply adds to the overload. Therefore, prioritization of primary tasks can justify 
why users are less likely to spend additional time and effort in order to comply with ISPs.  
For practitioners, the implication is that excessive use of IT might be threaten to organizational 
ISS. Organization leadership and IT departments should consider the dimensions of technostress 
as they levy work requirements on their employees and be aware that too much stress and strain 
will result in ISS vulnerabilities.  For example, they should consider reducing the required amount 
of ICT usage like e-mail loads as it might increase the probability of accidental clicks on phishing 
links like using a filtering mechanism to limit the number of received emails. Information security 
professionals should also consider providing immediate IT technical support to address the 
additional techno-stressor (techno-unreliability) brought on by the additional workload. Techno-
unreliability may result in employees finding unsecure work-arounds to accomplish their required 
duties at the expense of ISP. The findings would guide practitioners and ISS professions to focus 
on certain IT features to alleviate the negative impacts. 




We acknowledge the findings of this study are restricted by some limitations. First, although we 
took the scenario approach to manipulate users’ security-related behaviors, the scale measured the 
employee’s intention for information security. Users’ actual ISS performance might not be well 
predicted by reported behavioral intentions. Similar to D. Biros, M. Daly, and G. Gunsch (2004), 
future research should consider designing experiments to verify the effect of technostress on actual 
behaviors. Second, techno-uncertainty and techno-unreliability compared to other stressors, 
showed lower loading reflected on technostress. The findings are similar to previous studies (Ragu-
Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar et al., 2007b) in which techno-uncertainty had a lower than 40% 
weight on technostress construct. To assess further, we regressed technostress on techno-
uncertainty and techno-unreliability as only two first-order factors. Interestingly, the loading was 
around 60% with considerable R2 (> 30%), suggesting that techno-unreliability and techno-
uncertainty explained significant variance of second-order technostress construct. However, future 
research might investigate reflected items that capture these two factors in order to assess their low 
loading at the presence of other technostress creators.  
Third, while we did not control for individual differences such as age, gender, personality traits, or 
self-efficacy,  previous studies found that individual differences determine different levels of 
technostress perception (Maier et al., 2019; Tams et al., 2018). Our post hoc analyses of regressing 
demographic factors on technostress, and behavioral intention demonstrated the regression 
coefficient for job experience and industry sectors are significant. Users with more job experience 
perceived low levels of technostress and are less engaged in ISP violations. Moreover, depending 
on the industry, employees realize technostress in different ways. Therefore, future research should 
investigate a sample of sector-specific data to provide empirical findings for our theorized 
relationships. We did not observe the statistically significant impact of age and gender on 
technostress. This is not surprising since a few previous studies could not report that technostress 
is impacted by these factors (Marchiori, Mainardes, & Rodrigues, 2019; Wang, Shu, & Tu, 2008). 
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Nevertheless, there is some evidence report older people and women experience high techno-
complexity and techno-uncertainty (Marchiori et al., 2019; Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008). Moreover, 
ISS literature identifies gender as a factor influencing users’ intention to comply with ISPs (Herath 
& Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2014). Hence future research should apply gender theories or conduct 
qualitative approach to provide in-depth insight on the effect of age, gender, and other 
demographics on the technostress and security-related behaviors.  
Finally, it is worthy of investigating the possible mitigating factors of technostress to enhance ISP 
compliance. Such studies might utilize protection-motivation theory and apply technostress 
inhibitors (Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012) to assess the effects of 
organizational support  (e.g., technical support) and perceived benefits (e.g., promotion or reward 
expectancy) that might incentivize employees to tackle technostress in favor of complying with 
ISPs.  
2.8 Conclusion 
This study investigated how employees respond to perceived technostress in terms of ISP 
violations. Beyond the specific security-related stressors, we extended the technostress 
phenomenon to the behavioral research domain of ISS, which has not been addressed in previous 
research. Moreover, we empirically evaluated and added a new dimension to the technostress 
instrument called “techno-unreliability.” Our findings indicated that a set of techno-stressors 
(complexity, uncertainty, insecurity, workload, unreliability, invasion) compels users to become 
involved in insecure behaviors. Also, users with high levels of perceived strain (burnout) due to IT 
use are more likely to violate ISPs. Furthermore, an in-depth investigation on each sub-dimension 
of technostress led to a better understanding of the effect of each techno-stressors on employee 
behavior where some stressors had greater impact on rising the likelihood of ISP non-complaint 
behaviors. Overall, our findings provided insights into the negative consequences of IT on users’ 
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security- related behaviors. Such insights can help researchers to assess individual differences in 
technostress perceptions and various features of technology in order to propose mitigation 






UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY COMPLIANCE 
FROM ROLE THEORY PERSPECTIVE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The number of information security (InfoSec) breaches has been rising recently(IBM, 2019), and 
InfoSec professionals report employees as the main InfoSec threat in protecting organizational 
assets(Crossler et al., 2013). Organizations implement InfoSec policies (ISPs) and require 
employees to follow security guidelines, but not all comply(Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & Zhai, 2013). 
In most cases, employees violate ISPs without malicious intentions as they confront situations at 
the workplace that make them neutralize and rationalize their security inactions(Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; M. T. Siponen & A. Vance, 2010). Information system (IS) research identified a situation 
wherein the perception of stress results in poor behavioral outcomes at the workplace(Ayyagari et 
al., 2011; Guimaraes & Igbaria, 1992; Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar et al., 2007b). Stress is a 
consequence of disparity between environmental demands and individuals’ ability to respond to 
required demands(Lazarus, 1993). While researchers acknowledge the adoption of security system 
technologies and enforcement of ISPs are necessary, they can create a stressful environment for 
users to promote ISP violations(D'Arcy et al., 2014; D’Arcy & Teh, 2019; Pham, El-Den, & 
Richardson, 2016). Scholars conceptualize this phenomenon as security-related stressors of 
technostress (i.e., stress related to technology use(Tarafdar et al., 2007b)). Security requirements 
involve additional levels of complexity, uncertainty, and workload (security-related 
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techno-stressors), making employees spend additional time and effort to learn and understand 
complicated and continually updated technological aspects of security. Due to the cost associated 
with ISP compliance, users rationalize their behaviors to violate ISPs. As an exemplar study, 
D'Arcy et al. (2014) investigated the effect of security-related stressors on employee intention to 
violate ISP. They drew on emotion-based coping theory and moral disengagement theory as 
mechanisms to explain how individuals respond to security-related stressors through moral 
justification, detaching from reality, and minimizing the consequences of behaviors. One area of 
research that appears to require additional investigation is role stress at the workplace.  
In addition to technology use as a source of stress in the workplace(Ayyagari et al., 2011), role-
stressors are considered as work-stressors too(Chen & Spector, 1992; Henle & Blanchard, 2008; 
Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964). According to the organizational role 
theory(Biddle, 1986; Kahn et al., 1964), employees perform certain roles for a given job position 
based on the required expectations.  Role theory posits that individual performance (role behaviors) 
at the workplace depends on the perceived expectations required by official (or unofficial) groups 
in organizations. Under some circumstances, the roles trigger stress when expectations are too 
much to handle, are ambiguously defined, or are contradictory to each other(Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Past organizational studies demonstrated that role-stressors, including role-ambiguity, role-
overload, and role-conflict, reduce job performance, satisfaction, productivity and cause frustration 
and depression (Beehr, Jex, Stacy, & Murray, 2000; Lambert, Hogan, Paoline, & Clarke, 2005). IS 
literature contributed to the effect of role-stressors on employee performance, such as job 
productivity, turnover, strain, organizational commitment, and discontinuance usage(Galluch, 
Grover, & Thatcher, 2015; Igbaria & Siegel, 1992; King & Sethi, 1997; Tarafdar et al., 2007b; 
Zhang, Zhao, Lu, & Yang, 2016). With respect to ISP compliance, Hwang and Cha (2018) 
examined the mediation effect of security-related role-stressors consisted of role-ambiguity and 
role-conflict on the relationship between security-related techno-stressors and organizational 
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commitment. They showed security-related techno stressors lead to higher security-related role-
stressors, which result in lower organizational commitment. However, they did not investigate how 
security-related role-stressors, either directly or through organizational commitment, could 
contribute to security-related behaviors. In their study, D’Arcy and Teh (2019) employed discrete 
emotions and coping responses as techniques to explain employee ISP compliance as a response to 
security-related stressors (which they called hindrance stress). Although this study conceptually 
indicates that hindrance stress may originate due to the role-ambiguity and role-conflict, the authors 
do not discern multiple dimensions of role stress and do not empirically measure and examine the 
effect of each role-stressors (e.g., role-ambiguity, role-conflict, and role-overload).   
Despite the research on security-related stressors(D'Arcy et al., 2014; D’Arcy & Teh, 2019; Pham 
et al., 2016) and the noteworthy studies by D’Arcy and Teh (2019) and Hwang and Cha (2018), the 
effect of stress rooted in employees’ role activities, including primary job duties (intra-roles) and 
security requirements (extra-roles) on their security-related behaviors requires investigation. Our 
understanding is limited regarding how role stress due to conflict, multitasking, and vague 
responsibilities influence employees’ security-related behaviors. While the popular press often 
notes that InfoSec is everyone’s business, it may not ring true when conflicting roles come into 
play.  When primary job roles are at odds with security roles or when additional duties are levied 
on employees, this leads to role-stressors that become apparent when employees are forced to 
choose between the two. 
ISPs are usually mandated in organizations, but employees often perceive them as extra-role 
activities and do not regard them as a part of their job and responsibility(Posey, Roberts, Lowry, & 
Hightower, 2014). We view employees’ primary duties as intra-role tasks and other additional 
duties that are not in their job description as extra-role duties. There is considerable research 
investigating intra-role and extra-role duties that aligns with this view(Kim & Mauborgne, 1996; 
Vigoda-Gadot, 2007). While some studies view the requirements of organizational policies, 
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including ISPs as intra-role(Hsu, Shih, Hung, & Lowry, 2015),  we see them additional duties 
outside the primary roles of the employees (e.g., a doctor’s primary focus is on healing patients, 
not InfoSec). A deeper discussion of this situation is outside the scope of this research, but we note 
that in this study, we refer to role-expectations as a combination of intra and extra role-activities 
(all duties that are officially/unofficially expected to be executed).   
In this study, we investigate the impact of perceived role expectations on employee ISP compliance. 
We aim to extend past research on the role stress in order to explain to what extent different types 
of role-stressors contribute to ISP compliance behaviors, which then could lead to appropriate 
mitigating strategies. Particularly, we seek to address the following research questions: 
RQ1. How does role stress relate to employee intention to comply with ISP, either directly or 
through organizational commitment? 
RQ2. How does and to what extent each type of role stress impact employee ISP compliance 
intention? 
Although past research has employed coping, neutralization, and social exchange perspectives as 
theoretical frameworks to explain why individuals rationalize their behaviors through emotions and 
cost-benefit analysis to respond to stress(D'Arcy et al., 2014; Teh, Ahmed, & D'Arcy, 2015), we 
draw on the role theory to understand how the stress induced by overload, ambiguous and 
conflicting role expectations influence employee ISP compliant behaviors. This research develops 
and empirically assesses a model to provide knowledge of the effect of three types of role-stressors 
(conflict, ambiguity, and overload) on employees’ intention to ISP compliant behaviors. We argue 
that while employees perform multiple unclear tasks with conflicting requirements, their perception 
of stress offsets their actions by focusing on their primary job tasks rather than practicing the best 
security behaviors. Simply put, when faced with the choice of accomplishing their primary duties 
or adhering to ISP, the latter will lose to the former. Consistent with Hwang and Cha (2018) we 
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also investigate the influence of organizational commitment, but here we examine how it mediates 
the relationship between role stress and ISP compliance intention. Furthermore, as a mitigation 
strategy to harness role-stressors, we evaluate whether organizational support could moderate role 
stress to enhance ISP compliance intention. The findings of this study illustrates the significance 
of role theory in InfoSec context, while also provide guidance for managers to take account of 
different types of role-stressors.   
3.2 Theoretical development 
3.2.1 Role theory 
Role theory explores human behaviors in a social setting wherein individuals are actors who 
perform a set of roles within an environment(Biddle, 1986). Individuals perform roles consisted of 
patterned and expected behaviors based on self-conception or prescribed by others(Wehner & 
Thies, 2014). Biddle (1986) designated that role theory relates to three concepts: characteristic 
(pattered) behaviors, social potions, and expectations (scripts). Depending on a given social 
situation and expectations prescribed for a role, different perspectives have been appeared to 
describe role theory. He discussed five such perspectives. 
• Functional role theory concerns a stable social system in which actors with identified social 
positions perform roles according to the exact taught and prescribed normative 
expectations. This perspective has become less relevant since social systems are not stable, 
and social actors may not perform paralleled to expected norms (personal beliefs and 
cognitions may interfere). 
• Symbolic interactionist role theory focuses on roles through social interactions where roles 
are shaped based on a situation perceived by individuals and involves norms, personal 
beliefs, attitudes, and environmental demands. This perspective fails to address the 
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boundaries of expectations, how they should be defined, and to what extent personal 
perceptions can intervene with roles.   
• Structural role theory concerns structuralism wherein roles are shaped within socially 
structured relationships reflected by the social environment, not by individuals.  
• Cognitive role theory concerns behaviors reflected by expectations resulting from a 
person’s own beliefs and others. In other words, performed roles are the outcomes of 
thought processes that are influenced by perceptions, cognition, and behaviors of self and 
others.  
• Organizational role theory describes roles in formal organizations that are task-oriented. 
Each individual has an identified social position that performs roles according to the 
organization’s required demands as well as norms reflected by other informal groups.  
The majority of the role theory research utilizes the organizational perspective of the role 
theory (Biddle, 1986; Sluss, Van Dick, & Thompson, 2011). The goal is to study how 
organizational roles influence employee attitudes and performance behaviors in the workplace. An 
employee in an organization is attached to a position that enacts certain roles corresponded to the 
normative expectations. The expectations are the combinations of the assigned formal tasks (e.g., 
intra-role tasks as per job description) and the requirements by others in the organizations (Biddle, 
1986; Katz & Kahn, 1978) (e.g., ISP requirements asked by security management). Due to the 
multiple sources for norms and various perceptions of norms by individuals (Biddle, 1986), 
employees may not cope with the expectations effectively. For example, role expectations may be 
interpreted differently from what they are stated by agents (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Also, role 
expectations may not be defined explicitly, and a person may conduct multiple roles with various 
expectations that exceed his/her capabilities to manage. These circumstances give rise to the 
concepts of role-ambiguity, role-conflict, and role-overload. Role-ambiguity is the extent to which 
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a person is not certain about the expectations, while role-conflict appears when there are multiple 
demands with different objectives (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Role-overload describes situations when 
the expectations are more than a person’s capabilities to carry out (Kahn et al., 1964). 
Organizational studies refer to them as role stress constructs that negatively influence human 
behaviors (Beehr et al., 2000; Lambert et al., 2005). In the next section, we discuss how each of 
these concepts relates to employee security-related behaviors. 
3.2.2 Role stress and ISP compliant behaviors 
Role theory(Kahn et al., 1964; Katz & Kahn, 1978) posits that individuals expect to perform 
according to their defined roles. It also suggests that inconsistency, the tension in task requirements, 
and uninformed responsibilities cause stress and prohibit them from executing their roles 
successfully(Kahn et al., 1964). Role stress occurs under three circumstances: role-overload, role-
ambiguity, and role- conflict.  
Role-overload is defined as a person’s perception of not being capable of handling all assigned 
tasks(Kahn et al., 1964). It happens when role expectations are high, and employees are incapable 
of addressing all demanding requirements.  ISP levies additional duties and tasks on employees.  
This can be as little as a requirement to lock a computer while walking down the hall to retrieve a 
print job or a much as having to complete an hour-long security awareness and training program. 
Either way, the additional tasks eat up valuable time adding to the employees’ feelings of stress.  
Role-ambiguity describes a lack of clarity in role requirements wherein either an individual does 
not have adequate knowledge about the task, or the consequence of their performance is 
unpredictable(Kahn et al., 1964). For instance, telling employees to secure their data when they are 
not working with it could have multiple meanings. First, it could mean to put it away to prevent 
unauthorized individuals from viewing it. Second, it could mean locking their computers when 
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stepping away. Third, it could mean actually encrypting data at rest. This can lead to confusion 
thereby taking up more of the employees’ valuable time.  
Role-conflict refers to inconsistent and incompatible task requirements. It happens when there are 
contradictory responsibilities in which tasks are not well-matched and in harmony with each 
other(Guimaraes & Igbaria, 1992; Katz & Kahn, 1978). For example, a nurse is required to respond 
immediately to a ‘code blue’ (e.g., cardiac arrest) s/he is compelled to respond immediately to save 
the patient’s life. At the same time, ISP requires the nurse to secure her/his computer before leaving 
the area. These are incompatible tasks. One requires the nurse to not waste a second responding to 
the code, whereas the other requires her/him to take time to secure their workstation.   
At the presence of role-stressors at the workplace, stressed-out people exhibit lower performance 
as stress diminishes ones’ ability to work effectively(Tarafdar et al., 2007b). Past research provided 
insights into the dysfunctional results of role stress leading to criminal and abusive behaviors such 
as theft and substance use(Chen & Spector, 1992). It also distracts employees from concentrating 
on their primary tasks and contribute to cyber-loafing(Henle & Blanchard, 2008).  
Behavioral InfoSec literature denotes that when employees experience low job stress, they show 
better performance in terms of InfoSec awareness (McCormac et al., 2018). Furthermore, a stressful 
environment at the workplace increases human security errors due to limited functionality of 
working memory (Renaud & Privacy, 2011) and reduces coping responses to InfoSec requirements 
(Božić, 2012). ISPs contribute to stress, and employees’ perceptions of security-related stressors 
contribute to the neutralization of ISP violations (D’Arcy & Teh, 2019; Teh et al., 2015). These 
studies suggest that security requirements cause work impediments (i.e., stress) as the constant 
change of ISPs is associated with confusion and ambiguity, where one can experience a lack of 
explicit knowledge and understanding regarding InfoSec (Hwang & Cha, 2018).  
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We argue that it is not only security-related stressors that lead to insecure behaviors. In fact, under 
role stress due to conflict, ambiguity, and overload expectations, it is highly probable that 
employees ignore the best security practices (extra-role duties) in favor of completing primary job 
responsibilities (intra-role duties). The reason is that they struggle enough with performing 
multiple, unclear, and contradictory role tasks and refuse to spend additional time and effort to 
perform security behaviors. As one endeavors to figure out how to accomplish his/her own job 
requirements, following ISPs are the less prioritized actions to perform. In other words, employees 
rationalize their ISP violations by focusing on their own job goals and accomplishing their primary 
tasks effectively. Consequently, they neglect and ignore ISPs as if they are not present. For instance, 
a user who runs multiple applications (overload) with dissimilar functionalities (conflict) may 
become frustrated enough to skip ISPs.  
Furthermore, according to Biddle (1986), role expectations are perceived based on norms, 
preferences, and beliefs, which can influence employee performance. Although ISPs are usually 
mandated in organizations, they often are perceived as extra-role activities and are not a part of 
their job and responsibility(Posey et al., 2014). Thus, role expectations regarding ISP demands may 
be given less preference to be executed when employees create their perceptions of their role 
expectations, including organizational tasks and security requirements. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that there is an inverse relationship between role stress and ISP compliance intention: 
H1: Role stress decreases employee’s intention to comply with ISPs.  
3.2.3 Organizational commitment as a mediator between role stress and ISP compliance 
intention 
The term commitment is defined as one’s willingness to devote his/her energy and loyalty to a 
social system(Kanter, 1968). Organizational commitment refers to one’s strong beliefs toward 
organizational goals/values and a desire to exert effort on behalf of the organization(Porter, 
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Crampon, & Smith, 1976). It also represents an employee’s identification and involvement in 
organizations (Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982). Based on this perspective, organizational 
commitment accounts for productive security-related behaviors (Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016; 
Stanton, Mastrangelo, Stam, & Jolton, 2004). Employees realize that when organizations 
implement a set of security guidelines, it implies that ISP compliant behavior is their responsibility 
to ensure InfoSec in their organization. They strive to follow security rules in order to support 
organizational values, exhibit their loyal membership to their organizations, and do not put the 
organization at a security risk.   
The literature on stress and employee behavior suggests that a stressful environment leads to a lack 
of organizational commitment (Beehr, 1998; Jena, 2015; Lambert et al., 2005). It is expected that 
an uncertain and unstable work environment (e.g., using uncertain and complex technologies) 
deviates employees from focusing on organizational objectives. For example, studies by Ragu-
Nathan et al. (2008) and Low, Cravens, Grant, and Moncrief (2001) showed that employee 
perceived stress reduces job satisfaction, enhances burnout, and subsequently leads to low 
organizational commitment. Thus, we posit that organizational commitment might mediate the 
relationship between role stress and ISP compliance intention. That is, individuals’ perception of 
stress resulting from role-overload, role-conflict, and role-ambiguity reduces organizational 
commitment. Consequently, people with low commitment are less likely to comply with ISPs and 
might participate in security violations.  Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
H2: The influence of role stress on ISP compliance intention is mediated by organizational 
commitment. 
H2a: Role stress directly reduces organizational commitment. 




3.2.4 Organizational support as a moderator between role stress and ISP compliance 
intention 
In order to control the negative effects of role stress on employees’ intention to ISP compliance, 
we explored the possibility of a factor that may mitigate stress at the workplace. Ragu-Nathan et 
al. (2008) assert that practical mechanisms such as organizational and technical supports are 
effective in the reduction of end-users’ stress and anxiety at the workplace. Consistent with the 
literature, we propose that organizational support can be practical to mitigate adverse outcomes of 
role stress. Perceived organizational support refers to the extent to which employees perceive that 
the organization cares about them and provide required help to fulfil their needs(Eisenberger, 
Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986). According to Bhattacherjee and Hikmet (2008), one aspect 
of organizational support is providing technical support for end-users. The availability of such 
organizational support can reduce employees’ tension through training, providing guidance, and 
being accessible to resolve difficulties that employees encounter while performing role 
tasks(Thompson, Higgins, & Howell, 1991). It can promote affects and beliefs and serve as 
extrinsic motivations to desirable organizational behavior(Bhattacherjee & Hikmet, 2008).  
Previous studies evidenced the positive influence of organizational supports wherein they are 
effective in moderating the effect of work stressors on negative psychological outcomes such as 
strain(Frese, 1999). Some evidence advocates organizational support reduces exhaustion and 
occupational stress and lowers job burnout(AbuAlRub, 2004; Jawahar, Stone, & Kisamore, 2007).  
The perception of organizational support is not expected to influence employees’ intention to 
comply with ISPs directly. Rather, it may help with the reduction of perceived stress due to the 
conflict and unclear duties in favor of obeying ISPs. For example, an IT assistant can provide useful 
instructions for a newly adopted system to reduce overload and ambiguity about its proper use. An 
employee with high perceptions of organizational support has more willingness to perform better 
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and payback the organization regardless of expending excess effort(Wang & Shu, 2008), inferring 
that s/he is more likely to respect organizational ISPs. Hence, we postulate that the relationship 
between role stress and ISP compliance intention is moderated by organizational support such that 
it reduces employee perceived role stress.  
H3: Organizational support moderates the negative relationship between role stress on ISP 
compliance intention in that the negative relationship is weaker with high organizational support.  




Figure 03.1 Research model 
 
3.3 Method: measurement and sample 
Measurement items were adapted from the literature. IS literature treats role stress as a second-
order factor(Hwang & Cha, 2018; Tarafdar et al., 2007b) that includes role-overload, role-
ambiguity, role-conflict. We adapted items for each of these factors from Tarafdar et al. (2007b) 
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and Ayyagari et al. (2011). Items for organizational commitment were used based on Hwang and 
Cha (2018). We operationalized organizational support as the availability of technical support  
Table 3.1 Measurement items and item loadings 




RA1. I am unsure whether I have to deal with Tech problems or with my 
work activities. 
0.85 
RA2. I am unsure what to prioritize: dealing with new technologies or 
my work activities. 
0.86 
RA3. I cannot allocate time properly for my work activities because my 
time spent on different technologies varies.  
0.78 
RA4. Time spent resolving technology related problems takes time away 




RC1. I am often asked to do things that are against my better judgment. 0.71 
RC2. I often receive an assignment without adequate resources/materials 
to execute them.  
0.79 
RC3. I often have to bend rules or policy in order to carry out an 
assignment.  
0.8 
RC4. I often receive incomplete requests from two or more people.  0.73 
 
Role-overload 
RO1. I often have to do more work than I can handle. 0.81 
RO2*. I am often required to do difficult tasks.  0.56 
RO3. I often work beyond actual or official working hours. 0.59 
RO4*. I often attend to many problems or assignments at the same time.  0.51 




OS1. Specialized instruction concerning the technology is available to 
me.  
0.77 
OS2. A specific person (or group) is available for assistance with 
technology difficulties. 
0.81 
OS3. When I need help to use technologies, guidance is available to me.  0.89 
OS4. When I need help to use technologies, specialized instruction is 
available to help me.  
0.90 
OS5. When there is a breakdown in systems, a specialized person 






OC1. I would be happy to spend the rest of my career in this 
organization. 
0.79 
OC2. I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it. 0.83 
OC3. I really feel as if this organization’s problems are my own.  0.80 




CI1. I intend to comply with the requirements of the ISP of my 
organization in the future. 
0.80 
CI2. I intend to protect information and technology resources according 
to the requirements of the ISP of my organization in the future.  
0.93 
CI3. I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my 
organization when I use information and technology in the future.  
0.85 




within an organization and adapted items from Thompson et al. (1991). Finally, the intention to 
comply with ISP was measured based on Bulgurcu et al. (2010). All items used a 7-point Likert 
scale from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree (see Table 3.1).  





Gender Male 172 (49.1) Employment 
status 
Full-time 290 (82.9) 
Female 178 (50.9) Part-time 60 (17.1) 
 
Age 
< 30 years 77 (22.0) Years of 
Experience 
< 2 years 10 (2.9) 
31-40 years 129 (36.9) 2-5 years 45 (12.9) 
41-50 72 (20.6) 5-10 years 65 (18.6) 
>50 years 72 (20.6) >10 years 230 (65.7) 
 
Education 
High school 85 (24.3) Daily 
technology use 
at workplace 
< 3 hours 24 (6.9) 
College 203 (58.0) 3-6 hours 133 (30.0) 




Education 40 (11.4)  
IT services 108 (30.9) 
Healthcare 40 (11.4) 
Government 22 (6.3) 
Other 140 (40.0) 
 
The survey was conducted among the U.S. individuals across industries via an online research 
marketing company. To ensure low response bias, this platform allowed us to obtain anonymous 
responses from a wide range of employed professionals in different job positions. The marketing 
research company distributed an online survey among their panel members and requested volunteer 
employees to take the survey. They paid participants a small monetary reward ($0.50) for providing 
a complete and honest response. We used the screening technique to assure that a sample of 
participants represent the population of our interest, whether they possess technology-based 
professions. According to the company feedback, 445 people accepted the consent form to 
participate in the survey, which 35 respondents did not pass the screening question. Sixty responses 
were eliminated due to incomplete or giving incorrect answers to attention check questions. 
Ultimately, we used a sample of 350 responses in our analysis. Table 3.2 illustrates the 
demographics of our respondents.  
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3.4 Data analysis and results 
3.4.1 Assessment of measurement validation 
We used Mplus and Lavaan package of R as the primary statistical tools and conducted a 
covariance-based structural equation modeling (SEM) to evaluate both measurement and structural 
model(Kline, 2015). To assess the measurement model, we performed confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) on the entire set of items where each item was loaded on its first order construct. Then we 
ran a CFA for a model considering second-order role stress construct. Table 3.3 presents the results 
of fit indices for all models. It suggests that the data fit the models adequately since the obtained 
values satisfied the recommended cut-off values by Kline (2015). The close values of CFI, TLI, 
GFI, AGFI, and NFI to one (> 0.90) may indicate a good fit (all are sensitive to sample size, and in 
some software, AGFI does not perform well which is less reported in literature recently) and values 
between 0.05 and 0.08 for RMSEA and SRMR indicate reasonable error approximation. 
While Chin (1998) recommended that majority of the items should have loadings greater than 60% 
(> 0.70 is ideal), the Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010) factor loading guidelines affirmed 
that loading of 0.35 and 0.30 are statistically significant for a sample size of 250 and 350, 
respectively (our sample size is 350). As Table 3.1 displays, most of items have loadings higher 
than 0.70 except for one item from role-ambiguity and three items from role-overload, which some 
are close to 0.60.  
Furthermore, we examined the reliability, convergent, and discriminant validity of the constructs. 
A reliable measurement scale must have composite (CR) and Cronbach’s alpha reliability (α) 
greater than 0.70 and average variance extracted (AVE) higher than 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981a). Also, discriminant validity is verified when the square root of AVE of each construct is 
larger than the inter-construct correlation coefficients and there is no evidence of cross loading 
where an item loading belonged to a latent variable does not have a higher value loaded on other 
latent variables (Koohang, Nord, Sandoval, & Paliszkiewicz, 2020). According to the results  
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Table 3.3 Goodness of fit for the measurement and structural model 
Fit 
indices 
χ2/d.f. CFI TLI GFI AGFI NFI RMSEA SRMR 
CFA 1 531.21/215 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.065 0.058 
CFA 2 564.16/221 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.90 0.067 0.063 
SEM 429.20/214 0.94 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.89 0.054 0.077 
 CFA 1, first order-factors; CFA 2, second-order factor; N.S., non-significant  
 
 
of Tables 3.4 and 3.5, all measures satisfy these criteria. We note that we observed accepted values 
of CR (0.79) and α (0.81), but a low AVE for role-overload (0.44) construct. As the inclusion of 
high loadings leads to high AVE(Farrell & Rudd, 2009), one reason for the obtained low AVE 
could be considering two items with loadings of 0.51 and 0.56 in the computation. After we 
removed items 2 and 4, the AVE value for role-overload increased to 0.54. Thus, these two items 
were removed from both measurement and structural model analyses since they improved the 
quality of our results. We computed AVE for the role stress by averaging the squared loadings of 
its three first-order factors. The obtained value was 0.71, which suggests the three first-order factors 
(overload, conflict, and ambiguity) explain a considerable amount of variance of role stress. 
We assessed the common method bias using two approaches. First, Harmon’s one-factor 
test(Podsakoff et al., 2003) was conducted to see whether a single factor accounts for the majority 
of the variance. In total, five factors emerged with the 70.5% cumulative variation with the largest 
of 31.4% variation which is less than a commonly accepted value of 50%. 
Table 3.4 Results of construct  reliability and validity 
 Mean STD CR α AVE RA RC RO OS OC CI 
RA 2.74 1.6 0.86 0.83 0.60 0.77      
RC 2.88 1.7 0.88 0.85 0.58 0.68 0.76     
RO 3.61 1.9 0.78 0.75 0.54 0.57 0.75 0.73    
OS  5.0 1.6 0.91 0.90 0.67 -0.29 -0.28 -0.18 0.82   
OC 4.4 1.7 0.90 0.90 0.70 -0.06 -0.21 -0.07 0.55 0.83  
CI 5.8 1.2 0.90 0.89 0.74 -0.44 -0.44 -0.25 0.31 0.22 0.86 
CR, composite reliability;  α, Cronbach’s alpha reliability; AVE, average variance extracted; RA, role-
ambiguity; RC, role-conflict; RO, role-overload; OS, organizational support; OC, organizational 
commitment; CI, compliance intention; The diagonal entries are the square root of AVE. 
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RA1 0.777 0.109 -0.044 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 
RA2 0.843 0.033 -0.014 -0.038 0.002 0.058 
RA3 0.699 0.013 0.105 0.095 -0.039 -0.034 
RA4 0.529 -0.025 0.219 -0.049 0.029 -0.089 
RC1 0.164 0.709 -0.059 0.007 -0.004 0.141 
RC2 0.025 0.625 0.201 -0.062 -0.061 -0.125 
RC3 -0.048 0.837 0.012 0.098 0.04 0.022 
RC4 0.014 0.629 0.226 -0.024 0.004 -0.092 
RO1 0.072 0.389 0.438 0.005 -0.01 -0.06 
RO2* -0.078 0.045 0.743 -0.005 -0.051 0.09 
RO3 0.014 0.003 0.7 -0.104 0.105 0.032 
RO4* -0.013 -0.017 0.721 0.033 0.112 -0.002 
RO5 0.181 0.345 0.404 0.001 -0.035 0.029 
CI1 0.012 -0.107 -0.028 0.755 -0.027 0.006 
CI2 0.004 0.025 -0.009 0.948 -0.005 0.028 
CI3 -0.068 -0.003 0.026 0.793 0.099 0.007 
OC1 -0.005 -0.069 -0.022 0.007 0.714 0.093 
OC2 -0.04 0.017 -0.042 0.039 0.772 0.082 
OC3 0.035 0.058 0.007 0.01 0.841 -0.043 
OC4 0.013 -0.034 0.072 -0.023 0.918 -0.011 
FC1 -0.032 0.041 0.036 -0.049 0.093 0.741 
FC2 0.066 -0.102 0.082 0.063 -0.031 0.788 
FC3 -0.027 -0.039 0.04 0.057 -0.003 0.853 
FC4 -0.067 0.117 -0.04 0.007 0.011 0.926 
FC5 0.061 -0.063 -0.08 -0.016 0.061 0.676 
*Items removed from the SEM analysis due to the low factor loading in CFA results 
 
Second, according to Paul A Pavlou, Huigang Liang, and Yajiong  Xue (2007) the correlation 
matrix (Table 3.4) does not indicate a high correlation among constructs (r2 > 0.90). Therefore, the 
common method bias does not appear problem in our study.  
3.4.2 Assessment of structural model 
Next, we conducted SEM to test our hypothesized relationships. As mentioned above, we modelled 
the three sub-dimensions into the second-order factor, role stress, then it was related to other 
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constructs. As displayed in Table 3.3, fit indices verified the adequate model fit. Also, each stressor 
showed a significant, meaningful factor loading on role stress (see Figure 3.2). Previous research 
suggests individual differences could influence security-related behaviors(Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, 
Dykstra, & Ginther, 2018). For this purpose, we added a set of demographic factors in our model 
and controlled for their effects on ISP compliance intention. 
The results of the standardized path coefficients, significant level, and R2 values are presented in 
Figure 3.2. Role stress has a significant negative effect on ISP compliance intention (β= -0.35, p < 
0.001) and organizational commitment (β= -0.20, p< 0.001). Thus, provided support for H1 and 
H2a. Role stress reduces employee intention to comply with ISPs and reduces organizational 
commitment. Also, the path from the organizational commitment to the intention of ISP compliance 
is statistically significant (β= 0.15, p < 0.01), which provided support for H2b. Organizational 
commitment leads to ISP compliance intention. 
To ensure the presence of mediation effect in addition to verification by Baron and Kenny (1986) 
analysis, we performed the Sobel test for the indirect effect of role stress on ISP compliance 
intention through organizational commitment. We used the Preacher’ online Sobel test calculator 
(http://quantpsy.org/sobel/sobel.htm). The Sobel test statistics was significant (Z= -2.10, p < 0.05). 
This provided support for the H2 on the mediation effect of organizational commitment and ISP 
compliance intention relationship. However, because the direct effect of role stress to intention is 
significant, based on Baron and Kenny (1986), we concluded that the path from role stress to ISP 
compliance intention is partially mediated by organizational commitment. We tested for the 
interaction effect of organizational support with role stress. The result of the analysis did not show 
a significant interaction effect (β= -0.08, p >0.05). Thus H3 was not supported. Overall, given the 
value of 28% for the R2, our theoretical model demonstrated reliable explanatory power and made 






Figure 3.2 The results of the structural model testing. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p< 0.001; RA, role-ambiguity; 
RC, role-conflict; RO, role-overload 
 
Furthermore, we decomposed the relationship between role stress and intention to ISP compliance 
into three separate relationships to provide an in-depth understanding of how each role stressor 
reduces ISP compliance intention. We examined a direct relationship of each stressor by regressing 
them on the ISP compliance intention construct independently to address the multicollinearity issue 
that may appear when multiple constructs are used to predict one variable(Grewal et al., 2004). All 
role-stressors have statistically significant negative effects on ISP compliance intention. The 
standardized path coefficients for each stressor and R2 value are depicted in Figure 3.3. 
3.5 Discussion, contribution, limitation 
Overall, the findings of this study provided evidence on the contributed factors of employee ISP 
violations that the role stress arising from a combination of three stressors- overload, ambiguity, 
conflict- directly reduces individuals’ intention to comply with ISPs. Furthermore, it impacts 
organizational commitment negatively and leads to low ISP compliance. This paper has a few 






Figure 3.3 The results of the post hoc analysis, standardized path coefficients 
(R2); ***p< 0.001 
First, it contributes to the role theory literature and the negative influence of role stress on human 
performance(Ayyagari et al., 2011; Guimaraes & Igbaria, 1992; Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar 
et al., 2007b). Our results showed that the role theory, specifically organizational role theory, is a 
useful theoretical lens to understand security-related behaviors. Our empirical study revealed that 
when employees’ perceived role expectations are associated with some levels of overload, 
ambiguity, and conflict, they could engage in non-compliant behaviors. When faced with an ISP 
that either levies more duties and tasks on them or is in conflict with their primary role 
responsibilities or is unclear or ambiguous, employees will simply choose not to comply with it. 
Primary roles will take precedent over extra-roles. 
Second, previous research investigated the effect of security-related stress, wherein the objective 
of the studies is to determine how employees respond to security requirements(D’Arcy & Teh, 
2019; Hwang & Cha, 2018; Teh et al., 2015). These studies applied neutralization and copying 
theories to explain why employees violate ISPs when they feel high complexity, uncertainty, and 
verload due to security requirements. Although these studies provide insightful findings, they have 
some limitations: 
Control variables: 
Age, Sex, Education, 




(1) The main objective of them is to address ISP compliance influenced by the stress 
resulting from ISP essentials, not role responsibilities. We felt it is important to extend the concept 
of role stress beyond the ISP requirements. Thus, in this study, we employed role theory and 
described how the perception of role expectations (including both intra-extra roles) could influence 
security-related behaviors. We postulated that it is not necessarily only ISP requirements that cause 
stress. Instead, role stress rooted in one’s own job expectations can threaten organization security 
and directly influence employee security-related behaviors. Our results build on the noteworthy 
and commendable findings of previous researchers and depict that along with primary role stress, 
adding ISPs impose security-related role stress that can exacerbate the problem and worsen 
employees’ intention to not comply. 
(2) They did not evaluate and measure multiple dimensions of role stress separately. In a 
rare case, D’Arcy and Teh (2019) encompassed security-related stress on a 4-item scale, which has 
only one item to address role-conflict. In this research, we distinguished each dimension of role 
stress (i.e., ambiguity, overload, and conflict), conceptually defined each, explained how they might 
relate to ISP violations, and finally evaluated each using separate measures. 
(3) They did not investigate the direct effect of role stress on ISP compliance. The study 
by Hwang and Cha (2018) provides an understanding of how security-related technostress leads to 
lower organizational commitment through security-related role stress. However, they did not look 
into the mediation effect of organizational commitment on the relationship of security-related role 
stress and compliance intention. Here, not only we examined the direct relationship between role 
stress (intra-extra) and ISP compliance intention, we also showed that role stress indirectly 
contributes to lowering compliant behaviors through organizational commitment. 
Third, we decomposed the role stress construct in order to determine which dimension of role stress 
contributes more to ISP non-compliant behaviors. Of the three, role-conflict contributed the most 
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toward employee intentions of non-compliance. However, role-overload and role-ambiguity also 
had an effect. This is consistent with the research on intra-role and extra-role behaviors(Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1996; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007).  As we noted earlier, primary roles will take precedent. 
Although some previous research reported that role-overload did not lead to stress and did not 
impact employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment(Coverman, 1989; Lambert et al., 
2005), we found a negative direct relationship between role-overload and employee behavioral 
intention.   
Forth, corresponding to the past research(Safa et al., 2016; Stanton et al., 2004), our results 
provided additional support for the impact of organizational commitment in enhancing ISP 
compliant behaviors. Nevertheless, we found that organizational commitment acts as a mediator 
between role stress and ISP compliance intention. Although high perceived organizational 
commitment can be considered as an affirmative factor, our study showed that role stress works as 
a counterproductive factor that prohibits organizational commitment to achieve its goal to enhance 
compliance. Finally, similar to Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008), organizational support was not found to 
be capable of diminishing role stress in favor of more ISP compliance. One possibility is that our 
subjects did not experience role stress due to technical issues as we only examined one aspect of 
organizational support- technical support. Also, previous findings indicated that self-report 
measures do not exhibit significant moderating effects on stress, and objective factors are 
preferred(Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Wall, Jackson, Mullarkey, & Parker, 1996).  
For managers and security professionals, this study emphasized the role of occupational stress as 
a major contributing factor to InfoSec insider threats. Security managers might consider mitigating 
role-conflict through the use of technical controls rather than levy additional tasks on employees.  
The nurse who must respond to a code blue (intra-role) and also lock a computer down may get 
some relief from a technical control that would secure the device as s/he ran out of the room to 
provide medical assistance.  Security managers might also define and describe role tasks precisely, 
55 
 
providing training and instructions for task requirements to avoid ambiguity, and general managers 
should avoid assigning more tasks than employees can handle. While that seems obvious, this 
research demonstrated that task overload would lead to employee non-compliance with ISPs.  
Managerial control for role stress not only enhances the likelihood of individuals’ best security 
behaviors directly; it plays a role in increasing organizational commitment that results in higher 
secure behaviors.   
We acknowledge that this study has some limitations, which provides avenues for future research. 
We used a subjective measure of intention to comply with ISPs. Since behavioral intentions do not 
entirely capture actual individual behaviors(Crossler et al., 2013), future research may consider 
substituting it with objective measures. In contrast with our expectations, organizational support 
did not act as a moderator to control role stress and promote ISP compliance. Future research should 
explore other stress mitigation factors. Since the perception of stress is subjective and differs by 
people (Penney & Spector, 2005), coping strategies such as self-efficacy (Božić, 2012) can be 
utilized in our proposed model to alleviate the adverse outcomes of role stress.  
3.6 Conclusion  
The objective of this study was to investigate one of the contributing factors of employee ISP 
violations. Drawing on the role theory, we examined role stress as a second-order factor of three 
types of stressors rooted in job role responsibilities: role-overload, role-ambiguity, and role-
conflict. Our results demonstrated that role stress has a significant contribution to reducing 
employee intention to comply with ISPs. It also diminishes perceived organizational commitment 
and indirectly wards off ISP compliance. Further analysis showed that role-conflict has a stronger 
effect on ISP compliance intention compared to other stressors.  In general, this study shed lights 












UNDERSTANDING NON-MALICIOUS UNINTENTIONAL AND INTENTIONAL 
INSIDERS USING DUAL-SYSTEM THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL VALIDATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Information system security (ISS) is increasingly essential for organizations as security breaches 
are associated with monetary damage and loss of credibility (Cavusoglu et al., 2004). Despite 
various strategies that organizations consider to invest heavily in information security assets and 
infrastructure,  statistical analyses show that the number of data breaches and the volume of exposed 
records in the US has increased in recent years (J. Clement, 2020). In agreement with Cram, D'arcy, 
and Proudfoot (2019), we believe that behavioral information security has taken account of many 
studies regarding factors that contribute to information security compliance,  information security 
training, security awareness, and computer abuse (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Siponen, 2000; M. T. 
Siponen & A. Vance, 2010; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). However, the increase in the number of 
security incidents rooted in human factors (Bellika et al., 2018; IBM, 2019) implies that employees 
continue to be responsible for the majority of breaches. Further research is required to explore and 
understand human behaviors.  
Despite past beliefs that outsiders (e.g., hackers) are the main reason for security breaches, insiders 
or internal employees are the weakest link in cybersecurity as they account for more than 50% of 
security violations (Baker et al., 2010) and remain the top source of security incidents (Loch et al., 
1992a; PWC, 2018). Except for malicious insider threats (Liang et al., 2016), where individuals 
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with harmful intentions deliberately attempt to hack or steal data for personal gain, insiders may 
violate information system security policies (ISSPs) non-maliciously in two ways: intentionally 
and unintentionally. 
Non-malicious intentional (NMI) deviant behaviors are defined as security violations that are 
performed consciously against the organizational ISSPs with no malicious intent to cause 
destructions (Guo et al., 2011a). For example, writing down a password or sharing with a colleague, 
delayed backups, and installing unauthorized software are NMI. They make a conscious decision 
to violate ISSPs, but had no intention to cause harm.  In contrast, non-malicious unintentional 
(NMU) violations are those end-users’ behaviors that are performed unconsciously and 
inadvertently without harmful intentions (Ayyagari, 2012). Accidental modification of software, 
accidental clicks on phishing emails, and mis-delivery of sensitive data are examples of such 
misbehaviors. A Computer Security Institute (CSI) survey and other industry reports on 
information security incidents found that most of the security incidents are a result of non-malicious 
(intentional and unintentional) human behaviors wherein inadvertent breaches are the cause for 
almost 50% of the cases (Bureau, 2013; CSI, 2010; IBM, 2019; Identity Theft Resource Center, 
2019) and unintentional employee threat is the most common concern reported by professionals 
(Posey et al., 2014).   
Nonetheless, many of the ISS studies describe reasons for employees’ intentional (both malicious 
and non-malicious) behaviors, yet there is a lack of understanding of unintentional information 
security misbehaviors. Although unintentional misbehaviors do not arise from malicious intentions 
similar to NMI misbehaviors, they are distinguishable. The former refers to misbehaviors that an 
insider is not aware of breaking the ISSPs since misbehaviors occur unconsciously and unwillingly 
through honest mistakes, but the latter refers to misbehaviors that an insider consciously chooses 
to perform and breaks the ISSPs on purpose. In this case, the patterns and factors that explain 
intentional non-malicious misbehaviors may not be appropriate or relevant to unintentional 
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misbehaviors. Furthermore, extant research has employed several theories to understand why 
employee deviate from best security practices or fail to comply with ISSPs.  Such theories are the 
theory of planned behavior, deterrence theory, motivation-protection theory, neutralization theory, 
and rational choice theory (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010; M. T. Siponen 
& A. Vance, 2010; Straub Jr, 1990; Warkentin et al., 2016). 
The purpose of applying these theories (and others) is to identify contributing factors or 
determinants of employees’ compliance (non-compliance) behavior with ISSPs. In other words, 
applied theories in ISS literature explain individuals’ intentions and rational decision-making 
processes and may not be extendable to unintentional security misbehaviors. In the aforementioned 
theories, the voluntary omission of best security practices is explained by why an employee 
intended or decided to (not to) comply with ISSPs. Whereas conscious and rational-based theories 
cannot explain unintentional misbehaviors that take place when a user does not know where or 
when they failed to comply with ISSPs.   
Our understanding of unintentional insiders is limited to definitions and a few conceptual 
frameworks of contributing factors (Ayyagari, 2012; Pond & Leifheit, 2003). To fill the research 
gap, this study proposes the dual system theory (DST) (Evans, 2003; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) 
as a theoretical framework to explain the behavioral mechanism of unintentional insiders and 
distinguish it from NMI. According to DST, human decisions follow two distinct cognitive 
systems, where individuals perform certain behaviors with either conscious (reflective) or 
unconscious (reflexive) mental processing. Non-malicious insiders commit ISS misbehaviors either 
consciously/intentionally through the reflective system or unconsciously/unintentionally through 
the reflexive system. To understand why insiders engage in non-malicious information security 
misbehaviors (NISMs) (both intentional and unintentional), we build on the prevailing DST and 
develop a theoretical model based on the two systems influencing employee NISMs. Given that 
individual risky decisions correspond to the DST(Mukherjee, 2010; Reyna & Farley, 2006), we 
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conceptualize the elements of DST, with a set of human factors including risk-taking behaviors, 
impulsivity, and curiosity. Impulsivity represents the reflexive system, and curiosity represents the 
reflective system, causing an outcome called conscious and unconscious risk-taking behaviors, 
which result in NISMs.  
We assess our proposed model using an online survey from a sample of employees who had 
computer-based professions. Our results showed that that employees with high impulsivity 
(unconsciousness) and curiosity (consciousness) are more involved in conscious and unconscious 
risk-taking behaviors and, in turn, leading to higher NISMs.  We also assert that this relationship 
will be moderated by perceived work-overload and information security awareness. High workload 
enhances the likelihood of risky decisions due to the activation of the reflexive system and results 
in more NISMs. High information security awareness reduces risky decisions by activating the 
reflective system and lead to fewer NISMs. By focusing on both intentional and unintentional 
NISMs, this research extends the behavioral ISS literature and introduces DST as a useful 
framework to explain employees’ noncompliance behaviors with ISSPs. 
4.2 Theoretical Background   
4.2.1 Dual System Theory  
Dual system theory (DST) posits that individuals’ decision-making process follows two distinct 
systems (Evans, 2003; Lieberman, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Reber, 1989; Sloman, 1996; 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In cognitive neuroscience and psychological research, these two 
cognitive systems are described as implicit versus explicit (Reber, 1989), conscious vs. unconscious 
(Sloman, 1996), automatic vs. controlled (Lieberman, 2007), and reflective vs. reflexive-impulsive 
(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Drawing on these studies, we summarize the 
differences between two systems by referring to the terms, reflexive and reflective systems.  
The reflexive system is explained as a system where processes are automatic, rapid, reflexive, and 
emotion-based. It involves unconscious reasoning in which a person is not aware of a mental 
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process. Thought processes do not engage a person’s working memory, and decisions are made 
with very low effort. In other words, the term automatic, unconscious mental process refers to any 
process that is uncontrollable, and a person is not aware of it, and unconsciously or unintentionally 
will start it (Bargh, 2014). As a result, the behavior is performed automatically with no conscious 
attention and no deliberate control. A manifestation of the reflexive system can be represented by 
impulsivity. It refers to a personality trait that reflects a desire to act without thinking and planning 
for the consequences of the action (Coutlee, Politzer, Hoyle, & Huettel, 2014). A cognition process 
of an impulsive person is less likely to assess the situation and possible outcomes. Therefore, an 
impulsive person decides spontaneously through the activation of an automatic mental process 
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
Conversely, the reflective system is described as the rule-based, analytic, and the rational system 
in which mental processes are controllable, and a person is conscious of them. This reflective 
system is cognitive, emotionally neutral, and involves working memory with more slow and 
sequential thinking. Cognitive processes are associated with awareness and intention. 
Consequently, a behavioral outcome arises consciously with a high level of controls on automatic 
responses in the reflexive system.  Curiosity, often understood as a positive desire or motivation 
associated with the recognition and self-regulation to challenge opportunities and experience 
novelties (Kashdan, Rose, & Fincham, 2004), represents activation of the reflective system. It is a 
specific form of information seeking differentiated from the fact that it is internally or externally 
motivated as a need for cognition (Loewenstein, 1994). Curious people seek information through 
conscious decision-making processes for several reasons, just as they look for food (Kidd & 
Hayden, 2015). Hence, a curios person decides consciously to experience and learn something by 
activation of the analytical system.   
An interplay between the reflective and reflexive systems manifest in behavioral outcomes such as 
risk-taking behaviors (Trimpop, 1994). According to cognitive psychology, risk must always be 
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considered within a decision theory context (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981), because humans perceive 
risks either by the analytical system (using algorithms and formal logic) or experiential system  
 
Figure 4.01. Dual System Theory 
 
(using intuitive, quick, and automatic) mental processes (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2004). Thus, individuals take risks based on either rational or non-deliberate/immediate decision-
making processes (Reyna & Farley, 2006; Slovic et al., 2004). Figure 4.1 depicts the elements and 
mechanisms of the DST. 
Building on DST, NISMs could be explained as an outcome of risk-taking behaviors triggered by 
either reflective or reflexive systems. Unintentional NISMs occur when an employee unconsciously 
through automatic systems, takes unconscious risks and is involved in an insecure behavior. 
Intentional NISMs are committed when employees decide to violate ISSPs by their own will 
through rational thought processes and conscious risk-taking behaviors.  
4.2.2 Non-Malicious Information Security Misbehaviors (NISM) 
Drawing on the behavioral ISS studies, Guo (2013) categorized security-related behaviors in terms 
of computer abuse (Straub Jr, 1990), security contravention (Workman & Gathegi, 2007), unethical 
use (Leonard & Cronan, 2001), omissive behavior (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008), IS misuse 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009), ISSP violation (M. T. Siponen & A. Vance, 2010), and ISSP compliance 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). In a broader scope, human threats can be categorized into the internal and 
62 
 
external environment to the organizations, and each is divided into intentional and unintentional 
human actions (Loch et al., 1992a). Intentional undesirable actions within organizations are also 
classified based on the nature of intent: malicious vs. non-malicious. Intentional malicious behavior 
refers to any deliberate misuse of organizational assets by employees which puts organizations at 
risk of security and cause several damages like financial or reputational loss (Liang et al., 2016; 
Straub Jr, 1990) such as sabotage, data theft or corruption, or any cybercrime activities (Willison 
& Warkentin, 2013). Intentional non-malicious behavior is knowingly perpetrated by an insider 
who participates in unsecure volitional behaviors without malicious intent that causes damage such 
as password sharing and using personal devices for work purposes (Guo et al., 2011a). 
Unintentional ISS threats are the result of users who have authorized access to the organizational 
assets and unknowingly, with no malicious intent violates, the organizational ISSP (Ayyagari, 
2012) such accidental clicks on phishing emails or unauthorized disclosure by inadvertent sharing 
of sensitive data(Khan, Kim, Mathiassen, & Moore, 2020). Since the focus of this study is to 
understand non-malicious unsecure behaviors, we will refer to both intentional and unintentional 
non-malicious behaviors and aim to distinguish them through the DST.  
The similarity between these two is that both insiders are not ill-motivated and do not have harmful 
intentions to cause a security incident, although both increase vulnerabilities to potential threats. 
For example, a user may leave a PC unlocked volitionally because of the annoyance logging-in 
frequently (NMI). That user meant no harm but deliberately violated ISSPs.  The same user may 
mistakenly leave a PC unlocked because of running an urgent errand (NMU). However, both 
misbehaviors put the organization at risk of exposure. Nevertheless, they differ to a great extent. 
NMI insiders break the rule (ISSPs) on purpose for their benefits such as utilitarian outcomes, 
normative outcomes, or saving time and effort (Guo et al., 2011a) by balancing the costs and 
benefits of their action through rationalization (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  In contrast, NMUs break 
the rules through honest mistakes without expecting any beneficial outcomes. The reasons might 
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be ignorance, cognitive limitations, high-risk tolerance, lack of attention knowledge, and 
demographic personality factors (Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Bergey, et al., 2014). NMUs can happen 
in two ways: with information security awareness and without information security awareness. On 
one hand, in the absence of security training and awareness, a user does not know what the expected 
secure behavior is. Thus, any ISSP violation can be considered as an unintentional misbehavior. 
For instance, if the organization does not train users that delaying software updates increases system 
vulnerabilities, avoiding to update is completely an unintentional and accidental error. On the other 
hand, when users have security awareness, they may behave fallaciously like those who are without 
security awareness. Some external factors can influence users’ performance and put her/him in a 
favorable situation to unconsciously commit a violation of policy. For example, if a user is under 
pressure to perform multiple tasks simultaneously, s/he is more likely to click on a phishing link 
accidentally, without checking the sender’s information.  
We utilize DST to better explain the difference between these two types of non-malicious 
behaviors. According to DST (Evans, 2003; Lieberman, 2007), individuals’ decisions to perform a 
particular behavior depends on the degree of awareness of a mental process and ability to control 
the behavior. The level of consciousness distinguishes deliberate actions from unintentional 
actions. Given that, non-malicious misbehaviors can be performed consciously and unconsciously. 
If a person unconsciously violates ISSPs, they engage in unintentional NISMs, suggesting that 
automatic/reflexive mental process is activated. It means that an unintentional insider is not aware 
of a misdeed and how and when it occurred. For example, due to a load of emails, a user may 
automatically click on an email, including phishing links, without thinking that it may be 
suspicious. On the other hand, intentional NISMs are performed by users who consciously decide 
to violate ISSPs. In this case, decisions follow the cognition and rational system (reflective system), 
which could be controlled and regulated by the users. For example, consider an employee who 
knows that copying organizational information to personal USB drives is against the policy. 
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However, s/he decides to copy information to continue the work at home in order to complete tasks 
faster. Therefore, employees commit NISMs through cognitive processes corresponded to DST. 
4.2.3 Risk-Taking Behavior, Mechanism, and its Consequences   
Risk is perceived and defined differently depending upon the objective and context of the study 
(Šotić, Mitrović, & Rajić, 2014) such as sociology, economic, health, management and decision 
making, e-commerce, information privacy, and information security (Beck, 1992; Bennett, 2010; 
Bodin, Gordon, & Loeb, 2008; Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2008; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; 
Van Schaik, Jansen, Onibokun, Camp, & Kusev, 2018). Some authors define risk as an expected 
loss or the tolerance of potential negative consequences to obtain higher gains (Campbell, 2005; 
Oppe, 1988). Some regard risk as exposure to an uncertain proposition or an inevitable behavior 
that changes in any environment and associated with some degree of uncertainty of the outcomes 
(Trimpop, 1994). It also involves future events and their consequences (Aven & Renn, 2009). For 
example, Kim et al. (2008) investigate the effect of perceived risk on customers’ online purchasing 
decisions. In information security and risk management, Bodin et al. (2008) describe three facets 
of risk as expected loss, expected severe loss, and standard deviation of loss associated with a 
breach of information security. Some studies also refer to risk as users’ perception of a security 
threat in which the magnitude of a security risk determines decisions to commit behavior 
(Farahmand & Spafford, 2013). Overall, the risk is defined as a degree to which an act depends on 
what people know about the act and is associated with uncertainty and loss or damage in some 
cases (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981).  
Based on the definition of risk, risk-taking behavior is defined as any conscious or unconscious, 
controlled, or uncontrolled behavior with a perceived uncertainty about its outcome - positive or 
negative (Trimpop, 1994). According to the literature, risk-taking behavior appears in two ways by 
(1) conscious, rational decision-making processes, and cognitive assessment on risk-benefit trade-
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off; and (2) non-deliberate processes with the immediate decisions (Reyna & Farley, 2006; Slovic 
et al., 2004; Trimpop, 1994). Stated differently, humans perceive risks either by the analytical 
system based on algorithms and normative rules (e.g., calculating the probability, formal logic, and 
risk assessment) or by the experiential system which is intuitive, quick, mostly automatic, linked 
by experience to emotion and affect, and not so much accessible to the conscious system (Slovic et 
al., 2004). For example, in the presence of danger, a person decides to (or not to) take a risk in two 
ways; by either fast, instinctive, and intuitive reactions or with logic, reason, and cognitive 
assessment toward the danger. When a person takes risk consciously, they are willing to explore 
and take possible challenges with no specific awareness of the outcomes. In contrast, unconscious 
risk-taking behavior is when the person’s judgment is blurred, and for many reasons, they involve 
in risky behavior without fully understanding and assessing the situation. This mechanism of risk-
taking behavior corresponds precisely with the description of DST, suggesting that risky decisions 
are processed under uncertainty by assessing outcome values through a combination of reflective 
and reflexive systems. (Bureau, 2013; Mukherjee, 2010; Reyna & Farley, 2006).  
Risk literature denotes that risk-taking behavior cannot describe a single personality trait, and it is 
influenced by characteristics of the person and the situation as the result of both deliberative and 
affective evaluations (Figner & Weber, 2011), which suggests that risk-taking behavior may be 
correlated with other personality traits. People with various personality traits and individual 
differences engage in risky behaviors such as desirability and risk-propensity (Dewett, 2006), 
openness to experience and extraversion (McGhee, Ehrler, Buckhalt, & Phillips, 2012), impulsivity 
(Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000), sensation-seeking and locus of control (Bromiley & Curley, 1992), 
and curiosity (Kashdan, Elhai, & Breen, 2008). Among these factors, we specifically are interested 
in impulsivity and curiosity since both concepts have been investigated in the risk literature 
(Kashdan et al., 2008; Mishra & Lalumière, 2011), organizational literature (Henle, 2005; Reio Jr 
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& Wiswell, 2000), and ISS studies (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Aivazpour & Rao, 2018; 
Hadlington, 2017).These two factors also represent elements of the DST in this study. 
Impulsivity describes a personality trait of a person who acts without thinking and planning for the 
consequences of the action, which often results in undesirable outcomes (Coutlee et al., 2014). 
Based on this definition and mechanism of risk-taking behavior, a reflective system of an impulsive 
person is less likely to assess the situation and possible outcomes. Therefore, an impulsive person 
decides automatically via activation of the reflexive system and participate in unconscious risk-
taking behaviors (Mishra & Lalumière, 2011; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Curiosity explains 
situations where individuals are motivated to assess existing possibilities to challenge opportunities 
and experience novelties (Kashdan et al., 2004). Curious people knowingly seek information and 
have a high willingness to take risks for the sake of exploration and experience (Zuckerman, 1979). 
Therefore, a curios person can be thought of as a risk-taker to experience and learn something by 
activation of the reflective system, regardless of the possible outcomes. 
Risk-taking behaviors are associated with both negative and positive outcomes. On the one hand, 
risk-taking behavior in management studies demonstrates that engagement in risk results in positive 
outcomes, such as the circulation of financial goods (Zaloom, 2004), entrepreneurial behaviors 
(Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999), and productive investments (Sauner‐Leroy, 2004). Moreover, 
employees’ risk-taking behavior is correlated with high creativity (Dewett, 2007) and innovative 
behaviors (Yuan & Woodman, 2010). On the other hand, risk-taking behavior could be associated 
with adverse outcomes such as personal health loss or organizational financial loss (Yates & Stone, 
1992), deviant behaviors at the workplace (O’Neill & Hastings, 2011), and organizational failure 
(Singh, 1986; Vaughan, 1999).  
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4.3 Model Development   
Our proposed model presented in Figure 4.2 demonstrated that elements of the DST consisting of 
the reflexive system (impulsivity) and reflective system (curiosity) results in risk-taking behavior, 
which is a formation of the interplay between two systems. In turn, risk-taking behaviors (either 
conscious or unconscious) will influence NISMs. Two moderating factors of perceived work- 
 
Figure 4.2 Theoretical Model (relationships with dotted lines indicate mediation effects) 
 
overload and information security awareness will also impose negative and positive impacts on the 
relationship between risk-taking behavior and NISMs.  
4.3.1 Risk-Taking Behavior and NISM   
Risk perceptions and risky decisions are essential elements of cognitive/affective processes, which 
can help understand how the commitment of NISMs originates in the mind of an insider (Bureau, 
2013; Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Bergey, et al., 2014). While using computers and networks in the 
workplace, employees may confront situations that make them ignore ISSPs consciously or 
unconsciously. Consider an employee who works on the organization’s sensitive data and shares 
the office with his colleagues. According to the organizational ISSPs, he must lock his computer 
68 
 
whenever he leaves the desk. Nevertheless, because he has trust in his colleagues and finds it more 
convenient not to log in frequently, he consciously decides to take a risk to violate the ISSP 
whenever he leaves the room. Although he is aware of the potential security threats and perceives 
some level of a security risk (either low or high), due to the positive attitudes towards his colleagues 
and high willingness to make risky decisions, and in order to gain personal benefits, consciously 
decides to take risks and engage in intentional NISMs (reflective system). After repeating this 
practice for a while, this behavior becomes a habit, and ultimately, following an automatic mental 
system (reflexive system), he unconsciously becomes involved in risky unconscious behavior and 
performs unintentional NISMs. The correctness of this scenario can be confirmed relying on the 
studies by Colquitt, Scott, and LePine (2007) who explained people with high trust beliefs are more 
likely to engage in risky behaviors, and Karjalainen, Sarker, and Siponen (2019) who explain the 
nature of employees’ decisions to perform ISS behavior is dynamic and changes over time.  
In another circumstance, employees take risks when using employer-issued devices at home for 
personal activities (e.g., online shopping) or use unsecured Wi-Fi to be available when they work 
remotely.  It is also probable that an employee due to the negligence without consciously verifying 
the information of senders takes a risk and accidentally infects a system by mistakenly clicking in 
a phishing scam (D. P. Biros, M. Daly, & Gunsch, 2004). Usually, hypersensitive employees who 
have a fear of being criticized have a low-risk propensity and double-check anything they do in 
order to reduce their risky behaviors (Lukacs, Negoescu, & David, 2009). In contrast, people with 
high-risk propensity do not assess outcomes of their actions, and regardless of what the 
consequences are, immediately take action. One employee may consciously take a risk and through 
rationalization (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010) and neutralization (M. T. Siponen & A. 
Vance, 2010) of his/her behavior participates in intentional NISMs. Alternatively, in particular 
situations (e.g., finishing a task immediately), they may engage in unintentional NISMs where his 
decisions are made automatically with no awareness of possible consequences of the behavior. We 
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acknowledge that risk-taking behaviors can relate to unintentional NISM only when users, to some 
extent, have security awareness. If a user was never taught security violations, risk-taking behaviors 
would not be reasonable because all NISMs are unintentional, practically related to unconscious 
risks. Here, we assert that a well-informed user may contribute to unintentional NISMs due to the 
high willingness to take risks by the unconscious decision making process.  
Overall, past research indicated that employees who typically are risk-takers they are more likely 
to contribute in adverse organizational outcomes (O’Neill & Hastings, 2011; Singh, 1986; 
Vaughan, 1999) as well as falling to phishing (Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 
2010). Also, people who are lesser risk-takers in their personal life regarding health and safety, pay 
more attention to update security patches and to secure their devices (Gratian et al., 2018). Hence, 
we hypothesize that employees with high risk-taking behaviors at the workplace are more likely to 
perform intentional and unintentional NISMs through the conscious and unconscious decision-
making process.  
Hypothesis 1: Risk-taking behaviors are positively related to NISMs. 
4.3.2 Impulsivity, Curiosity, and NISM   
Impulsive behaviors give rise to adverse outcomes at the workplace, such as employees' deviant 
behaviors, lack of self-discipline, workplace violence, and employment instability (Henle, 2005). 
In ISS literature, Hadlington (2017) and Egelman and Peer (2015) found a negative relationship 
between impulsivity and security behaviors, and in particular cases, it relates to phishing 
susceptibility (Welk et al., 2015). Although these studies examined the direct relationship between 
impulsivity and nonsecure behaviors, some research showing individuals with high levels of 
impulsivity are more likely to take a risk with a low perception of hazards (Coutlee et al., 2014; 
Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). This suggests that impulsive people underestimate the potential 
security risks associated with misbehaviors. An impulsive insider without forethought may take 
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risks and engage in NISMs through activation of the reflexive system, considering that the 
probability of a security threat is low and no potential harm will be arisen from deviation of ISSPs. 
Given that impulsive people are more risk-takers (discussed in section 2.3) and risk-taking 
behaviors leads to NISMs (H1), we expect that the impact of impulsivity on NISMs will be 
mediated through risk-taking behaviors. In fact, impulsivity may not be a predictor of NISMs by 
itself, but can result in NISMs by triggering unconscious risk-taking behaviors (full mediation 
effect).  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of impulsivity on NISMs will be fully mediated through risk-taking 
behaviors in such impulsivity positively relates to risk-taking behaviors (H2a), and risk-taking 
behaviors positively relate to NISM (H1).   
Curiosity is considered a valuable workplace personality trait since it enhances employees' job 
performance through motivations towards exploration and learning (Reio Jr & Wiswell, 2000). 
Contrarily, it may become a potential security threat and lead to security incidents. End users who 
like to explore networks, browse websites, or install advanced software or programs (especially for 
personal activities with work devices) knowingly seek to gain knowledge and contribute to 
conscious risky behaviors. Ultimately, they may non-maliciously contribute to ISSP violations and 
accidentally corrupt systems and increase the vulnerabilities of ISS incidents. Sometimes, curiosity 
can be sufficient by itself to motivate an employee (via activation of the reflective system) to take 
advantage of his capabilities to violate ISSPs just for gaining knowledge and, as a matter of 
eagerness, takes a known risk to see what really can happen (Sarkar, 2010). Moreover, curious 
insiders are the main target of malicious insiders to lure and attract them by using curiosity-
exploiting subject lines to open malicious e-mail attachments or phishing links (Abraham & 
Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Moody, Galletta, & Dunn, 2017). From the prior discussions, we expect 
that curiosity will prompt individuals to make risky decisions, and in turn, risky decisions induce 
employees to engage in NISMs. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
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Hypothesis 3: The effect of curiosity on NISMs will be fully mediated through risk-taking 
behaviors in such curiosity positively relates to risk-taking behaviors (H3a), and risk-taking 
behaviors positively relate to NISM (H1).   
4.3.3 Perceived Work-overload and NISM 
Perceived work overload is the perception that a person has too much to do, and available resources 
are not sufficient to accomplish tasks (Leiter & Schaufeli, 1996). It happens when a person 
perceives that the assigned work is more than his capability or skill level (Moore, 2000). In this 
case, he needs to accomplish tasks under time pressure to meet deadlines, which makes him feel 
overloaded. As a result, due to the limited capacity of cognitive system (working memory) to 
process information, perceived work-overload will lead to low-quality employee performance in 
terms of decisions and reasoning (Eppler & Mengis, 2004), feeling stressed (Ayyagari et al., 2011), 
engagement (Okolo, 2018), job turn over (Moore, 2000), organizational commitment  (Ahuja, 
Chudoba, Kacmar, McKnight, & George, 2007), and IT adoption and innovativeness with IT 
(Pennington, Kelton, & DeVries, 2006). Regarding information security, scholars found that ISS 
requirements increase workload with adding additional tasks (e.g., updating patches) and make 
employees feel stressed and be interrupted to perform their primary job tasks and as a result, 
intention to violate ISSPs increases (Albrechtsen, 2007; D'Arcy et al., 2014).  
According to the mechanism of decision making through the DST (Evans, 2003), employees are 
inclined to follow the reflexive system under perceived work-overload. Due to the feeling stressed 
and time pressure to accomplish tasks, employees are less likely to decide through high-quality 
reasoning, deeper cognitive processing, and rationalization (Eppler & Mengis, 2004; Turel & 
Qahri-Saremi, 2016). Stressful situations resulting from high workloads disrupt rational and 
deliberative mental processes, and decisions are more intuitive and automatic (Porcelli & Delgado, 
2009). For example, consider a person who receives too many emails in a day for communicating 
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and integrating multiple tasks. It is highly probable that due to a large number of received emails, 
individuals’ recognition of detecting phishing emails be reduced, and accidental clicks on phishing 
links give rise to unintentional NISMs. In another case, an employee may intentionally ignore 
ISSPs (NMI) because their priority is to accomplish job tasks instead of performing ISS 
requirements. A non-risk-taker in a typical workday who attempts to comply with ISSPs, when in 
conditions of work overload, may have to take risks and non-maliciously violate security 
regulations. Therefore, we expect that perceived work-overload increases the likelihood of NISMs 
by itself and also increases the propensity of employees to make risky decisions and consequently 
involve in NISMS. 
Hypothesis 4a: Perceived work-overload is positively related to NISMs.   
Hypothesis 4b: Perceived work-overload will positively moderate the relationship between risk- 
taking behaviors and NISMs.   
4.3.4 Information Security Awareness and NISM 
Many security errors occur with a low-level understanding of the right action. While ISS scholars 
emphasize the role of information security awareness on the enhancement of compliance with 
ISSPs and effective security management program (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Siponen, 2000), IDG 
Research services reported that the majority of organizations in the U.S. provide security awareness 
training to their employees, but 29% of organizations train only once a year (IDG Research, 2018). 
Information security awareness is defined as an employee’s general knowledge about information 
security and the organization’s security objectives (ISSPs) (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Siponen, 2000). 
The goal of awareness is to reduce the number of security errors in terms of protection, integrity, 
and information confidentiality. A wide range of ISS studies have shown that information security 
awareness changes employee’s information security behaviors. Recently, Cram et al. (2019) 
conducted a meta-analysis to identify antecedents to ISSP compliance. In 27 studies (out of 95 
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papers included in the meta-analysis), security training and awareness (SETA programs) is one of 
the identified categories with a medium/large effect size. We explored each of these empirical 
studies to look at the role of security awareness in security-related behaviors. Except for three 
studies by Abed, Dhillon, and Ozkan (2016), Brady (2010), and Donalds (2015) which examined 
the effect of security awareness on the intention to general ISSP compliance, in all studies, the 
information security awareness construct has an indirect effect on security behaviors as a predictor 
of attitudes, beliefs, perceived sanctions, rewards, and other outcomes (D'Arcy, 2005). Considering 
the findings of Cram et al, (2019), the direct effect of information security awareness on NISMs is 
less known.  
Despite prior studies which described that security awareness develops attitudes toward intention 
to compliance over time (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), we argue that a user with a higher level of security 
awareness is less likely to contribute in NISM because they are well-informed about potential 
threats that arise from insecure behaviors and are educated not to commit in ISSP violations or 
insecure decisions. A user may not be aware of the risk of public Wi-Fi or opening unreliable links 
and attachments, and due to unconsciousness, may become involved in unintentional NISMs. 
Security training, like anti-phishing training programs, can be useful in identifying fraudulent 
websites (Sheng et al., 2007). Moreover, an insider who is used to ignoring secure behaviors and 
violates ISSPs non-maliciously for his benefits (e.g., to save time and accomplish tasks faster) with 
a high-security awareness will be able to regulate his personal preferences through rationalization. 
The analysis of perceived benefits compared to perceived costs associated with either ignorance or 
compliance can result in less insecure decisions and behaviors (Li et al., 2010). Therefore, we argue 
that a user with a high level of security awareness is better able to utilize cognitive mental 
processing to better avoid NISMs. 
Furthermore, information security awareness can alleviate risk-taking behaviors. Risky beliefs and 
risky behaviors are consequences of a users’ lack of security awareness (Badie & Lashkari, 2012). 
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Given the DST, a knowledgeable risk-taker user is better able to assess uncertain outcomes 
associated with his insecure behaviors (using the reflective system) and is capable of controlling 
his willingness to take a risk whenever he aims to perform NISMs. Recently, McCormac et al. 
(2017) found that there is a negative correlation between risk-taking behavior and information 
security awareness wherein individuals with high information security awareness take fewer risks. 
SETA programs can be successful at enhancing employees’ recognition of security threats and 
cognitive biases that affect risky decision making (Bureau, 2013). In sum, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5a: Information security awareness is negatively related to NISMs.   
Hypothesis 5b: Information security awareness will negatively moderate the relationship between 
risk-taking behaviors and NISMs.   
4.4 Methodology  
4.4.1 Measurement  
We utilized an online survey instrument to collect data. Respondents received a set of questions 
designed to measure the proposed model constructs. Drawing on the literature, we selected an initial 
set of items and then modified some (as needed) in order to reflect our proposed model. Curiosity 
was measured with ten items adapted from Mussel, Spengler, Litman, and Schuler (2011). We 
deliberately choose this scale as it measures employees’ work-related curiosity since we are 
interested in human behavior at the workplace. Similarly, we measured individuals’ work-related 
risk-taking behaviors using eight items adapted from Dewett (2006). Impulsivity was measured 
using 13 items from Coutlee et al. (2014) that tapped into attention, motor, and non-planning 
dimensions of impulsivity. To measure NISMs, we used a scale developed by Hadlington (2017). 
This scale addresses the main and common ISS violations based on ISS literature (D'Arcy et al., 
2014; Egelman & Peer, 2015) such as password sharing and choosing, using insecure USB devices 
or online storage systems, failing to update software, using unsecured wireless networks, and 
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clicking links without verifying the source. This scale consists of 20 items, although we only used 
14 of them and removed the other six for some reasons:  First, keeping a scale short is effective to 
reduce response bias (Hinkin, Tracey, & Enz, 1997). Second, some questions concern individuals’ 
personal life, and we are interested in behaviors in a professional setting. Finally, we limited 
questions to employees’ online behaviors at the work-place since digitization has changed the 
nature of work (Forman et al., 2014), and most of the job-tasks are performed through online 
platforms (Gloster, 2018). We believe many of NISMs include unsafe online behaviors. We 
measured perceived work-overload using four items applied in the Moore (2000) study. Items for 
information security awareness were taken from Bulgurcu et al. (2010). The items and scales used 
in this study are presented in Appendix 4. A.   
4.4.2 Sample   
To collect data, we used a crowdsourcing market research company located in the United States to 
distribute the survey among participants. This platform allows us to collect anonymous responses 
that are preferred to provide honest and desirable responses. The respondents were selected from a 
wide range of industries and job positions to provide a heterogeneous sample to address 
organizational or cultural differences (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). After completing the consent form, 
respondents were asked to pass a screening question to ensure they have computer-using 
professions and then were allowed to continue to answer survey questions. Upon completion of the 
survey, they received a small monetary reward. We eliminated 44 responses due to incomplete 
responses (i.e., fail to answer attention check questions or unreasonable survey completion time). 
In the end, we included 301 usable responses in our data analysis. Of the sample of 301 respondents, 
59 percent were male, 39 percent were between 31-40 years old, and around 43 percent had the 
daily internet usage of more than six hours at the workplace. Also, 93 percent of respondents had 
high information security knowledge which provided the valid sample to assess our proposed model 
(i.e., in case of committing unintentional NISMs, the reason is not because of the lack of awareness, 
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instead other predictors detect the level of contribution to unintentional NISMs). The mean value 
for each items of the information security awareness scale was also calculated (See Appendix 4.A). 
All values were above 4.1 (out of 5) which implied that most of the respondents reported that for 
each individual item they had high levels of awareness. Table 4.1 reports sample demographics. 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Respondents (N=301) 
  Frequency Percentage 
Gender  Male 178 59 





18-30 years 83 28 
31-40 years 119 39 
41-50 years 50 28 
51-60 years 36 17 




High School or equivalent 75 25 
College graduate 167 55.4 
Higher-Education 49 14.5 
Other 10 3.3 
 
Employment  status 
Full-time 271 90 
Part-time 27 9 
Unemployed 3 1 
 
 
Years of experience 
Less than 2 year 3 1 
2-5 years 38 13 
5-10 years 64 21 
Above 10 years 196 65 
Industry Education 34 11.2 
IT Services 73 24.3 
Healthcare 30 10 
Government & Non-Profit 34 11.3 
Other 130 43.2 
Daily Internet usage at the 
workplace  
Less than 3 hours 47 15.6 
3-6 hours 125 41.5 
More than 6 hours  129 42.9 
Level of overall awareness of  
organizational information 
security (scale of 1-5) 
Low (<=2) 13 4.3 
Medium (=3) 8 2.7 




4.5 Data Analysis and Results  
We used Mplus as the primary statistical tool to analyze the measurement and structural models. 
Since the nature of our study is theory testing in the context of predictive modeling, a covariance-
based technique-  structural equation modeling (Ullman & Bentler, 2003) is well suited for our 
research to analyze latent variables and their relationships.  
4.5.1 Measurement Model   
To evaluate psychometric properties and quality of measurement scales, we examined model fit, 
individual item reliability, convergent validity, composite reliability, and discriminant validity of 
the measurement model (Donald Barclay, Christopher Higgins, & Ronald Thompson, 1995) before 
testing the structural model as recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988).  
First, to test whether the data fit the measurement model, we performed a confirmatory factor 
analysis on each construct separately and then on the entire set of items (Brown, 2015). One 
dimension of the impulsivity construct (motor) did not show a good fit. All items in the first-order 
motor construct had deficient loading factors (less than 0.5) and weak fit indices (Chin, 1998). In 
order to obtain a good fit, we removed those four items as well as one from perceived work-
overload and one from the NISM construct. As a result, the finalized measurement model satisfied 
the threshold of good model fit corresponded to Ayyagari et al. (2011), suggesting that the data fit 
the model well. Results of CFA- fit indices (CFI, RMSEA, SRMR) are reported in Table 4. 2. All 
values are above/below the cutoffs of 0.90 for CFI, 0.10 for SRMR, and 0.10 for RMSEA (Kline, 
2015). 
Table 4.2 Goodness of Fit Assessment for the Measurement and Structural Models  
Goodness of fit measures χ2 (d.f.) χ2 /d.f CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Good model fit ranges Non-sign. < 2.00 > 0.90 < 0.1 < 0.1 
CFA Model 1873 (1014) 1.84 0.91 0.053 0.063 
SEM Model 1875(1016) 1.84 0.91 0.053 0.064 
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Second, we examined factor loadings of items belonging to each construct and the average variance 
extracted (AVE) to test item reliability and convergent validity of constructs. As reported in Table 
4.3, all of the measurement item loadings are above the recommended value of a minimum of at 
least 0.50 (good) and 0.60 (very good), indicating 50% or more of the shared variance with the 
construct (Chin, 1998). Except for NISMs with AVE of 0.48, the obtained AVE values for all 
reflective constructs support convergent validity by exceeding the minimum required value of 0.50 
(Chin, 1998). The low AVE could be a result of consideration of two factors in its computation: 
low factor loadings less than  0.60) and a large total number of items in the construct (Farrell & 
Rudd, 2009). 
Third, to ensure the scale reliability, we assessed Cronbach’s alpha reliability and composite 
reliability. From Table 4.3, the scores for Cronbach’s alpha ranged from 0.76 to 0.93 and for 
composite reliability ranged from 0.79 to 0.94, which all are higher than the acceptable value of 
0.70 (Gefen et al., 2000). Finally, to confirm the discriminant validity of constructs in our model, 
the square root of the AVE for each construct was calculated. It is recommended that AVE value 
to be higher than the inter-construct correlation scores in order to show that constructs are loaded 
on their focal constructs and less on others (Fornell & Larcker, 1981b). As presented in Table 4.4, 
the diagonal values (square root of AVE) in the constructs’ correlation matrix all are larger than 
off-diagonal correlations. Consequently, the results of Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 demonstrate 
supportive evidence for the validity and reliability of our measurement model.  
It is recommended to evaluate common method bias when the independent and dependent variables 
in a study are measured using the same instrument (Podsakoff et al., 2003). To assess the potential 
common method bias in our model, we performed Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003) 
and a test by Paul A Pavlou et al. (2007) to examine the correlations between constructs. In 
Harman’s one-factor analysis, the goal is to observe whether a single factor emerges or one single 
factor explains a large amount of the variance. After conducting the test, eight factors emerged with  
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Table 4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Statistics 
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Table 4.4 Latent variable Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. CUR IMP RTB ISA PWO NISM 
CUR 4.01 0.94 0.74      
IMP 2.1 0.97 -0.73  0.77     
RTB 3.1 1.8 0.34  -0.10+ 0.81    
ISA 4.2 0.85 0.63  -0.52  0.21  0.82   
PWO 2.86 1.88 -0.11+  0.22  0.1+  -0.12  0.74  
NISM 1.7 1.1 -0.23  0.18  0.11  -0.34  0.33  0.69 
 
the 60% of cumulative variation with the largest of 24% variation for a single factor, which is less 
than the commonly accepted threshold of 50%. These results confirm that common method bias is 
not a serious issue in this study. Following Paul A Pavlou et al. (2007), we performed a test to 
calculate correlations between constructs of our model to see if there is a high correlation among 
constructs (r2 > 0.90). According to the results of Table 4.4, none of the constructs are extremely 
correlated to each other. This provides additional support that common method bias does not pose 
a threat to our analysis.  
4.5.2 Structural Model   
Since we were ensured of the adequate reliability and validity of our constructs, we tested the 
hypotheses by performing path analysis through structural equation modeling (Byrne, 2013). The 
results of the structural model, including standardized path coefficients, the significance of the path 
coefficients, and the amount of explained variances (R2) are shown in Figure 4.3. Based on the 
significance of path coefficients and corresponding effect sizes, all hypotheses were supported and 
exhibited meaningful path coefficients (Chin, 1998). The structural model explained 39% of the 
variance related to non-malicious information security misbehaviors and 17% related to risk-taking 
behaviors. The significant positive effect of risk-taking behaviors on NISMs (β= 0.21, p<0.001) 
provides support for H1. Risk-taking behavior is positively related to NISMs. The significant 




Figure 04.3 The Results of the Structural Model Testing 
 
behavior provide support for H2a and H3a. Curiosity and impulsivity are positively related to risk-
taking behaviors. Additionally, the direct path from both impulsivity and curiosity to NISMs was 
not significant, suggesting complete mediation, according to Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Furthermore, we performed the Sobel test using Preacher’s online calculator 
(http://quantpsy.org/sobel/sobel.htm). The Sobel test statistics for the relationship involving 
curiosity (Z= 3.31, p < 0.001) and impulsivity (Z= 2.57, p < 0.01) were both significant. Therefore, 
H2 and H3 were supported. The effect of impulsivity and curiosity on NISMs is fully mediated by 
risk-taking behaviors.  
The significant positive effect of perceived work-overload on NISMs supports H4a (β= 0.30, 
p<0.001). Perceived work-overload is positively related to NISMs. Also, the positive significant 
moderation path (β= 0.15, p <0.01) of perceived work-overload on the relationship between risk-
taking behavior and NISM provides support for H4b. Furthermore, the significant negative effect 
of information security awareness on NISMs supports H5a (β= -0.31, p<0.001). Information 
security awareness is negatively related to NISMs. Finally, results showed that information security 
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awareness had significant interaction with risk-taking behavior (β=- 0.20, p<0.001) to influence 
NISMs, which provides support for H5b. 
In order to realize the interaction effects, we plotted the significant interactions following Aiken, 
West, and Reno (1991). Figure 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) show how perceived work-overload and 
information security awareness interact with risk-taking behaviors. Figure 4.4(a) illustrates the 
simple slopes of NISMs on Risk-taking behaviors at high and low values of information security 
awareness. The results of the slope test show that when security awareness was low, risk-taking 
behavior had a positive effect on NISMs. When security awareness was high, the relationship 
between NISMs and risk-taking behaviors became less strong and almost flat, meaning that higher 
levels of information security awareness tend to mitigate the influence of risk-taking behavior on 
NISMs. The results indicate that risk-taking behavior was effective in increasing NISMs when the 
level of individuals' security awareness was low.  
Additionally, Figure 4.4(b) illustrates the simple slopes of NISMs on risk-taking behaviors at high 
and low levels of perceived work-overload. These results indicate that the relationship between 
NISMs and risk-taking behavior became stronger and positive under the condition of a higher level 
of perceived work-overload.  
4.6. Discussion, Implications, and Future Research   
4.6.1 Discussions of the Findings   
We examined the antecedents of one crucial aspect of behavioral information system security (ISS), 
namely non-malicious information security misbehaviors (NISMs). We drew on dual systems 
theory (DST) to distinguish intentional and unintentional NISMs. We posited that impulsivity and 
curiosity could be representatives of the reflexive and reflective systems of the DST, which lead to 




Figure 4.4(a). Riks-taking behavior  × 
Information Security Awareness 
 
Figure 4.4(b). Riks-taking behavior × 
Perceived Work-Overload 
 
Figure 4.4 Interactions of Perceived Work-overload and Information Security Awareness with Risk-Taking 
Behaviors 
the logic for why risk-taking behaviors would impact employees’ NISMs. We endeavored to 
understand the role of employees’ risk-taking behaviors (conscious and unconscious) in influencing 
intentional and unintentional NISMs originated by the activation of either reflexive or reflective 
systems. Furthermore, we showed that individuals’ perceived work overload and information 
security awareness interacted with risk-taking behaviors in affecting NISMs. Based on the data 
collected from 301 employees, all the hypotheses were supported. 
Consistent with the proposed research model, we found that employees who have a high willingness 
to take risks in the workplace are more likely to violate ISSPs either intentionally or unintentionally 
through the utilization of cognitive and automatic mental processes. Previously, Moody et al. 
(2017) had found that individuals with high-risk propensity and curiosity are more likely to click 
on phishing emails. Our results generalized this finding to a set of NISMs and indicated that risk-
taking behaviors mediate the relationship between NISMs and both impulsivity and curiosity. This 
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suggests that impulsive and curious employees are likely to engaged in risky behaviors and 
ultimately lead to non-malicious information security violations. Previously, scholars found that 
impulsivity has a direct effect on risky cybersecurity behaviors (Aivazpour & Rao, 2018; 
Hadlington, 2017). However, our results from mediation analysis showed that impulsivity does not 
influence NISMs per se; instead, it triggers risk-taking behaviors and ultimately leads to NISMs.  
We found that employees’ perception of high work-overload leads to more NISMs. Also, perceived 
work-overload positively interacts with risk-taking behaviors and enhances employees’ willingness 
to become involved in NISMs. Moreover, as we hypothesized, information security awareness has 
a negative influence on NISMs and plays an essential role in reducing NISMs due to the negative 
interaction with risk-taking behaviors. Interestingly, our statistical findings report that the positive 
impact of information security awareness in NISM reduction is negated by perceived work-
overload, suggesting that organizational effort in enhancing employee information security 
awareness can be simply offset by high levels of workload.   
4.6.2 Theoretical Contributions  
Our work makes several contributions to the field of ISS research.  First, the majority of behavioral 
ISS literature has investigated the theory of planned behavior, deterrence theory, motivation-
protection theory, and neutralization theory to identify root causes of intention to non-malicious 
information security violations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that utilizes 
DST in order to provide a theoretical explanation and empirical support for the impact of some 
individual factors on NISMs. We demonstrated that DST is appropriate in the NISM context to 
understand how employees decide to (not to) commit misbehavior intentionally and unintentionally 
through the employment of reflective or reflexive mental processes. An alternative theory to DST 
that has been applied in ISS studies could be a rational choice theory (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
However, rational choice theory only focuses on rationally decision-making processes through 
cost-benefit analysis to explain intentional NISMs and cannot address unintentional or unconscious 
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NISMs. Therefore, DST can fill this gap. Scholars previously have adopted DST as a theoretical 
basis in IS research, such as social networking sites and technology use (Liu, Wang, Min, & Li, 
2019; Turel & Qahri-Saremi, 2016). This study revealed that the DST is appropriate to be employed 
in ISS context too.  
Second, most behavioral ISS studies have attempted to explain intentional ISSP compliance or non-
compliance behaviors, either malicious or non-malicious. Given that the majority of security 
breaches are unintentional (IBM, 2019), our knowledge of unintentional misbehaviors is limited. 
There are a few non-empirical studies regards to unintentional violations that have provided only 
definitions, examples, and possible contributed factors of unintentional ISS misbehaviors (Greitzer, 
Strozer, Cohen, Bergey, et al., 2014; Loch et al., 1992a). Drawing on DST, we distinguished 
between intentional and unintentional non-malicious information security misbehaviors and 
offered a theory-based description of unintentional NISMs. Furthermore, despite many behavioral 
studies which use user intentions to measure the dependent variable, we measured self-assessed 
employees’ actual act of NISMs.   
Third, this study extends prior research on understanding human factors contributed to employees' 
security-related behaviors. Prior research has primarily focused on individual differences in terms 
of beliefs, attitudes, some personality traits (e.g., big five model), and demographic factors (Anwar 
et al., 2017; Hadlington, 2017; McCormac et al., 2017). We extend this work by leveraging some 
personality traits such as risk-taking behaviors, impulsivity, and curiosity to study their potential 
consequences in the context of NISMs. Moreover, there have been recent calls in the IS field for 
studies focusing on the psychology of insiders and the role of human factors, especially risk-taking 
behaviors (Bureau, 2013; Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Bergey, et al., 2014; Li et al., 2019; Sarkar, 
2010). In this study, we added to prior research and addressed recent calls. We empirically showed 
the problematic aspect of employees’ risk-taking behavior as a threat to information security. 
Furthermore, we found that impulsivity and curiosity have a positive influence on enhancing 
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employees’ risky decisions and ultimately make employees perform NISMs. Although curiosity 
and risk-taking behaviors are often encouraged in organizations as valuable factors to enhance 
creativity and productivity (Reio Jr & Wiswell, 2000; Yuan & Woodman, 2010), they can be 
considered as threats in the ISS. 
Fourth, while the extant literature has discussed the role of information security awareness in 
changing belief, attitude, and intention to conform to ISSPs, this study empirically investigated the 
direct effect of information security awareness on employees' actual security behaviors. We also 
show that information security awareness has a positive impact on reducing NISMs since risky 
decisions can be regulated under high levels of security awareness, suggesting the strong effect of 
information security awareness and highlights the importance of this construct in the context of 
ISS.   
Finally, our work contributes to understanding a relatively understudied concept of perceived work-
overload in the context of ISS. Prior research has extensively investigated the effect of perceived 
work-overload on employees’ performance, stress, turn over, and organizational commitment 
(Ayyagari et al., 2011; Moore, 2000), but to our best knowledge, this study is the first to empirically 
investigate the role of perceived work-overload in the context of an employee’s NISMs. We show 
that high-level perception of work-overload will result in NISMs. Furthermore, it increases the 
probability of employees’ unconscious risk-taking behaviors at the workplace to perform insecure 
behaviors. Recently, Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Bergey, et al. (2014) had proposed that work-
overload could be a possible factor in enhancing unintentional security misbehaviors. In this 
research, we address this concern, and empirically show that perceived work-overload has a 
significant influence on employees’ NISMs.  
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4.6.3 Practical Implications  
The results of this study suggest important practical implications for information security 
management practice. Based on the results, we suggest that information security practitioners 
should consider new strategies regarding individual and organizational practices. First, our findings 
reveal a significant impact of personality traits on employees’ ISSP compliance behavior, 
suggesting that individual differences cannot be taken for granted. Risk-taker employees with high 
impulsivity and curiosity are more likely to commit misbehavior and increase the risk of security 
threats in organizations. While risk-taking may be beneficial in some circumstances, this is not the 
case with information security. Assessment of employees’ risk propensity and the level of their 
impulsive actions can be beneficial in order to take required counteractions to apply controls on 
these behaviors if necessary. Curiosity and risk-taking behaviors are encouraged to increase 
innovations and creativity for firm performance purposes (Reio Jr & Wiswell, 2000; Sauner‐Leroy, 
2004). Nonetheless, too much support of these behaviors can be threatening as they may change 
the culture and norm of organizations and influence employees’ daily activities inherently, and 
consequently, risk-taking behaviors become a serious issue for information security.   
Second, our findings provide evidence of a significant impact of perceived work-overload on 
insecure behaviors. The level of perceived workload might be different between employees. 
Therefore, job tasks should be allocated based on the skills and capabilities of employees. 
Otherwise, employees may prioritize to perform their primary job tasks rather than fulfill the 
information security requirements. Moreover, due to the high work-overload employees may feel 
stressed and fatigued and, as a result, neglect or pay less attention to information security activities. 
Employers should be aware that in as workload increase so do the propensity for employee to 
commit NISMs.  
Third, the results of this study provide additional support for the strong influence of information 
security awareness. Since the lack of knowledge is rarely the fault of the user, organizations should 
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address this problem to ensure their employees have sufficient and up-to-date knowledge to secure 
organizational assets. Organizations should consider that the lack of security knowledge not only 
directly influences security misbehaviors but increases the likelihood of risk-taking behaviors in 
employees. Hence, information security awareness and training programs should be utilized 
regularly.  
 4.6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
Although we believe this work makes several contributions to the ISS research, it has the following 
limitations. First, we used self-assessed scales to measure constructs of the proposed model. 
Especially in a case of NISMs, even though individuals were asked to respond whether they 
perform a particular behavior or not (instead of measuring intention), measuring actual violational 
behaviors in a field setting can upgrade the validity of the model. Moreover, we assumed that items 
of NISMs include both intentional and unintentional misbehaviors since under certain conditions, 
each behavior can be performed either consciously or unconsciously. Since existing scales do not 
capture unintentional misbehaviors, we note this as a limitation and call future researchers to 
develop such scales or design experiments that assess unintentional NISMs. Second, employees' 
risk-taking behaviors can be shaped within their organizations apart from a personality trait. Our 
sample includes employees across various industries and organizations with different levels of risk 
perception and risk culture. Treating all respondents the same can make a potential bias for the 
accuracy of the results. Third, in this study, the security risk associated with each NISM assumed 
to be equal, while individuals may perceive the potential risk of each differently. Future research 
could control the magnitude of insiders’ risk perception associated with each misbehavior. 
Employees, even with a high-risk propensity, may behave differently based on the risk of security 
threats. Fourth, we limited the dimensions of the DST only to curiosity and impulsivity. Future 
research should consider other representatives, such as habitual behaviors for reflexive system or 
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self-regulatory factors (e.g., self-control, adaptability) for reflective system to examine their role in 
the context of ISSP compliance. 
Finally, our post hoc analysis on the effect of demographic factors on NISM showed that age (β= -
0.22, p < 0.001) and gender (β= 0.13, p < 0.05) are statistically significant determinants of NISMs. 
Future research should look at age and gender differences in risk-taking behaviors. Prior research 
indicates that females take fewer risks (Figner & Weber, 2011), but are less engaged in the best 
cybersecurity practices (Anwar et al., 2017). Examining gender differences in making risky 
decisions in the ISS context would advance our understanding of user behaviors.  
4.7 Conclusion 
Human error as the weakest link in information security remains a serious concern for 
organizations. This research enhanced our understanding of the impact of human factors on 
employees’ non-compliance behaviors with ISSPs. Drawing on the DST, we distinguished 
intentional and unintentional NISMs and provided a theoretical framework to examine employees' 
conscious and unconscious risk-taking behavior on the likelihood of insecure behaviors. We found 
that employees with high risk-taking behavior are more likely to engage in unintentional/intentional 
NISMs.  Also, impulsivity and curiosity are two individual factors that make employees more 
involved in unsecured practices via risky decisions with the exploitation of reflexive and reflective 
systems. Furthermore, we showed that when employees perceive high levels of work overload, they 
are more likely to make risky decisions and participate in insecure behaviors. In contrast, 
information security awareness can help employees to regulate their risky behaviors and less 
contribute to NISMs. This work supplemented behavioral research in the field of information 
security by demonstrating the role of human behaviors in organizations and providing insights into 










Behavioral information Security (InfoSec) has drawn the attention of many scholars in recent 
decades since the increasing number of security incidents rooted in human behaviors have become 
a major concern of organizations (Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). 
Despite past beliefs that external employees (outsiders) are the main security threats, most of the 
InfoSec violations occur within the organizations by insiders or internal employees (Baker et al., 
2010; Ernst & Young, 2002). For this reason, behavioral InfoSec has taken account of many studies 
regarding computer abuse, unethical use, IS misuse, omissive behaviors, and InfoSec policy 
violations (Guo, 2013).  The difference among these behaviors depends on the nature of intentions. 
Users intentionally violate InfoSec policies with either malicious intentions (e.g., sabotage or steal 
data) or non-malicious intentions (e.g., sharing the password with colleagues). Scholars extensively 
investigated insiders’ intentional behaviors in terms of motives, objectives, mitigators, and 
outcomes (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; M. Siponen & A. Vance, 2010; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). 
However, statistical reports show that in most cases, insider threats are due to unintentional non-
malicious InfoSec misbehaviors (NISMs) (Crossler et al., 2013; Identity Theft Resource Center, 
2019) such as accidental disclosure of sensitive data via the internet. Insiders’ unintentional NISMs 
are distinguishable from intentional NISMs, although both may have equally negative impacts     
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(Crossler et al., 2013; Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Bergey, et al., 2014). For example, a user may leave 
a PC unlocked volitionally because of avoiding logging-in frequently (non-malicious, intentional). 
The same user may unwillingly leave a PC unlocked because of running an immediate task (non-
malicious, unintentional). However, both misbehaviors put the organization at risk of exposure. 
Based on previously applied theories in InfoSec studies, we argue that theoretical frameworks 
utilized to explain insiders’ intentional NISMs are not appropriate in the context of unintentional 
NISM. Moreover, as per our knowledge, empirical studies investigating unintentional NISMs 
studies are relatively rare, and they are limited to provide definitions, examples, and introduce 
conceptual frameworks of possible predictors and consequences (Ayyagari, 2012; Crossler et al., 
2013; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). In a rare case, Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Moore, et al. (2014) 
examined insiders’ unintentional responses to phishing attacks. However, we believe that 
unintentional NISMs are not confined only to phishing threats. Hence, there is a lack of 
understanding in individuals’ unintentional NISMs, and further investigations are needed to 
generalize factors impacting unintentional NISMs.  
To this end, we propose a qualitative approach by interviewing employees across different 
industries. Drawing on the behavioral InfoSec literature, we developed an interview protocol that 
we use to conduct semi-structured interviews to identify the most-occurred unintentional NISMs 
and to understand why users become involved in such unsecured behaviors unintentionally. In other 
words, we aim to understand the nature of the unintentional NISMs and to identify contributing 
factors of such misbehaviors rooted in individual or organizational factors. Particularly, we are 
going to answer the following research questions:  
RQ1: What are the most common NISMs that employees commit unintentionally? 




We believe that interviews will allow us to gain a broad range of perceptions about employees’ 
unintentional NISMs at the workplace, and obtain a richer understanding of why individuals 
perpetrate unintentional NISMs. The results of our exploratory analysis will guide future 
researchers to develop theoretical models to find causal relationships between predictors and 
particular misbehaviors.  
5.2 Literature review 
Insiders are recognized to be the weakest link in InfoSec (rather than technical issues) and prevent 
organizations from achieving their InfoSec goals: confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
accountability in the whole organization (Siponen, 2006; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Insider 
threats arise from individuals who have the authorization to access to the information assets of the 
organization (Warkentin & Mutchler, 2014). To reduce the risk of insider threats, organizational 
strategies such as InfoSec policy and awareness programs are implemented (Siponen, 2000). 
However, the fact is that not all users comply exactly with security policies as prescribed (M. 
Siponen & A. Vance, 2010). Insiders’ non-compliance behaviors with InfoSec policies are 
classified into three categories (Loch et al., 1992a; Willison & Warkentin, 2013): (1) intentional, 
malicious computer abuse; (2) volitional (but not malicious) non-compliance; and (3) passive, non-
volitional non-compliance.  
The first category belongs to individuals who intentionally with malicious intentions threaten 
organizations’ security through deliberate actions (Liang et al., 2016). Examples of malicious 
behaviors are sabotage, data theft or corruption, fraud, or any deliberate policy violation, which are 
known as cybercrime (Warkentin & Mutchler, 2014). Potential malicious insiders’ characteristics 
or causes are personality problems, mental health disorders, personal or work-related events (e.g., 
sanctions or loss of family member), emotional issues, social conflict, financial status, and other 
elements indicated by Liang et al. (2016). Moreover, dark triad personality traits (e.g., lack of 
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impulse control), motive, computer dependency, ethical flexibility, capability, and reduced loyalty 
impact insiders’ malicious intent (Maasberg, Warren, & Beebe, 2015; Shaw, Post, & Ruby, 1999). 
The second category explains insiders with non-malicious intentions who involve in unsecured 
volitional behaviors such as writing down a password or sharing it with a colleague, leaving a PC 
unlocked, installing unauthorized software, using personal devices for organizational work, and 
delayed backups. Scholars define insiders’ intentional NISMs as behaviors that are done knowingly 
with conscious decisions against the organizational security policies with no malicious intent to 
cause destruction (K. H. Guo, Y. Yuan, N. P. Archer, & C. E. J. J. o. m. i. s. Connelly, 2011b). 
Non-malicious insiders violate policies voluntarily for their benefits like saving time and effort 
(Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Moore, et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2011b). The main motivations of these 
behaviors are utilitarian outcomes, normative outcomes, and self-identity outcomes, as determined 
by Guo et al. (2011b). These violations can be addressed and explained through neutralization, 
rationalization, cost-benefit analysis, persuasion, deterrence, or any other behavioral control (M. 
Siponen & A. Vance, 2010; Warkentin & Mutchler, 2014).  
Finally, third class refers to unintentional insider threats which arise from users’ NISMs who have 
authorized access to the organizational assets but inadvertently without harmful intentions violate 
security policies (Ayyagari, 2012; Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Bergey, et al., 2014). Human errors 
with no awareness of a misdeed such as accidental modification of software, corruption of data by 
a programming error, accidental clicks on phishing emails, forget to lock the PC, sending sensitive 
data to the wrong recipient, and accidental data exposure are some examples of unintentional 
NISMs. This type of threat is often used interchangeably with non-malicious threats, while they are 
two different concepts (Guo et al., 2011b). In both cases, insiders do not have harmful intentions 
or ill will motivations, but the main difference is that an unintentional insider breaks the rule 
unwillingly, and through an honest mistake, whereas an intentional insider performs NISMs by 
his/her own will and break the rules on purpose. One can infer that insiders with unintentional 
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NISMs are not aware of their actions in terms of how, when, and what. They may realize their 
misbehaviors after the incidents. Hence, they do not expect any beneficial outcomes as opposed to 
non-malicious insiders who expect some desirable outcomes such as quicker task completion (Guo 
et al., 2011b). Unintentional NISMs emerge from negligent users who are not aware they expose 
their organizations to security risk (e.g., fail to lock down a PC due to running immediate task), but 
intentional NISMs resulted from conscious decisions to violate security rules (e.g., fail to lock down 
a PC due to not log-in frequently).  
Although prior studies provided precious insights on employees’ security-related behaviors, we 
argue that most behavioral InfoSec studies provide little context concerning unintentional NISMs. 
First, each type of insider threat has a different nature in terms of intention, motivations, 
influencers, and perceived outcomes, suggesting that the findings of each type of misbehaviors are 
exclusive and cannot be fully generalized to other types of violations. For instance, although the 
concept of non-malicious intentional and unintentional misbehaviors may be blurred because of 
having no harmful intentions, they possess different rationales and casual factors. The former are 
rule-breakers with known reasons, but the latter involves those who do not know how, when, and 
under what circumstance they threatened security or broke the rules.  
Second, scholars utilized various theories to provide deep understating of individual’s NISMs such 
as the theory of planned behavior (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), deterrence theory (Straub Jr, 1990), 
motivation-protection theory (Ifinedo, 2012), neutralization theory (M. Siponen & A. Vance, 
2010), and rational choice theory (Li et al., 2010). These theories, mainly employed to explain 
employees’ cognitive and intentional NISMs, and they might not be appropriate in the context of 
unintentional NISMs. They attempted to explain the reasons for the omission of secure behaviors 
of people who fail to protect their systems, albeit they know how to do so (Workman et al., 2008).  
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Third, to the best of our knowledge, the number of studies explaining unintentional NISMs is 
limited. There are a few conceptual studies devoted to identifying possible contributed factors such 
as organizational or human-related factors. According to Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Bergey, et al. 
(2014), possible organizational factors may include an unfair work setting (e.g., interruptions), 
weak management systems (e.g., multitasking), and inadequate InfoSec training practices. Taylor 
(2006) found that management’s misperception of security risk gives rise to employees’ 
unintentional NISMs. As human factors, personality traits (e.g., risk propensity, curiosity) and 
health/psychological status (e.g., using drugs, stress and anxiety, sleepiness) may be potential 
reasons for NISMs (Ayyagari, 2012; Meek, Clark, & Solana, 1989). In some cases, scholars 
examined reasons that why employees respond to phishing emails like as risk propensity, curiosity, 
or high email loads (Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, Moore, et al., 2014; Moody et al., 2017; Vishwanath, 
Herath, Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011). Since the scope of NISMs are not limited only to phishing 
threats (i.e., they include but not limited to password sharing, password write down, failure to log 
off, and using personal devices for work purposes (Guo et al., 2011b)), we believe further research 
is needed to study users’ unintentional NISMs to generalize the findings. Furthermore, the 
increasing number of unintentional InfoSec incidents (Identity Theft Resource Center, 2019) 
provides additional motivations to conduct empirical studies. To address the aforementioned gaps 
in the literature, we next describe a qualitative approach to explore and explain factors contributed 
to unintentional NISMs.  
5.3 Research Method: Data Collection and Data Analysis 
The research context to investigate factors that impact unintentional NISMs lacks in providing an 
in-depth understanding of the InfoSec literature. Thus, we will conduct an exploratory research 
approach to interview employees to obtain their perceptions about unintentional NISMs as they are 
the weakest InfoSec at the workplace. We followed Mason (2017) approach to design a semi-
structured interview protocol using open-ended questions, starting from broad questions, and then 
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dividing them into mini questions. Our interview questions consisted of demographics asking about 
their background, organizations’ security training practices, work environment, and managerial 
controls (e.g., monitoring). Then it followed by questions relative to common InfoSec behaviors 
adapted by the literature, including device securement, password behaviors, clean desk, online 
behaviors, software updating, and remote access (Egelman & Peer, 2015; Guo et al., 2011b). In 
order to gain a rich understanding of NISMs’ leading factors, we designed questions in a way that 
to derive employees’ perceptions of why they committed a particular NISM. We asked whether 
they were conscious or unconscious of potential vulnerabilities while the misbehavior occurred and 
what was the possible factors that caused those misbehaviors. Table 5.1 presents our survey 
questions.  
We have started to collect data from a sample of informants, including employees in different 
positions and an InfoSec management team (Chief information security officer, security analyst) 
of a relatively large company (fuel service company ~ 22k employees). Once data are collected, 
we will analyze data following open, axial, and selective coding processes in order to find major 
themes and constructs in explaining unintentional NISMs (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). We will use 
the causal mapping technique to investigate the patterns and magnitude of the causality between 
identified factors and certain unintentional NISM (see figure 5.1). Causal mapping is a word-arrow 
diagram that indicates how one idea or action leads to another (Bryson, Ackermann, Eden, & Finn, 
2004). It usually includes map-level, construct-level, and between-constructs-level analysis to 
calculate density, centrality, and reachability among constructs (Ghobadi & Mathiassen, 2016).  
5.4 Preliminary Results 
After the analysis of a few qualitative data, an initial set of codes were determined. So far, the 
results showed that some organizational and human factors provide favorable situations for insiders 
to perform both intentional and unintentional NISMs. 
97 
 
Table 5.1 Interview protocol 
Demographics: 
 
Gender, major, age, industry, company size, full/part time, daily working hours, daily computer usage 
Interview questions: 
What is/was your job position?  
How many years of experience do you have? 
Do you feel overloaded by the level of work you are asked to perofrm? 
On a scale of 1-5 (1 is very low, 5 is very high), how distracting is your work environment? Explain.  
Are you aware of your company’s security policies? 
       On a scale of 1-5 (1 is very low, 5 is very high), how do you rate your level of information security     
awareness? 
Were you trained in IS security practices at work?  
What was the training like? Please explain.  
Were you trained during your orientation? Since orientation?   
Are you being monitored or observed during work that you know of? 
What best information security behaviors have you ever performed? Mark all that apply. 
Were you conscious of potential vulnerabilities when you were committing those misbehaviors?   
1- Intentional 
i. What do you think were the possible factors that caused those misbehaviors 
(e.g., careless, no fear, risk-taker, no policy, lack of monitoring, had to get 
another task done, etc.)? 
ii.  Any benefits that you could get by committing those misbehaviors?  
2- Unintentional  
i. What do you think were the possible factors that caused those misbehaviors? 
What was the reason of the accident? (e.g., being distracted, ….) 
Did you report your misbehavior to your company? Or shared with your colleague(s)? Why? 
Did/do you continue to commit such misbehaviors?  
Have you ever seen your colleagues deviate from security policies? Any idea why? 






I set my computer screen to automatically lock if I don’t 
use it for a prolonged period of time.  
  
I use a password/passcode to unlock my laptop or tablet.   
I lock my computer screen when I step away from it.   
I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone.   
I lock the door of my office when I leave the room.   
Password Behaviors 
I change my passwords even if I don’t have to.   
I use different passwords for different accounts that I 
have. 
  
When I create a new online account, I try to use a 
password that goes beyond the site’s minimum 
requirements.  
  





I don’t share passwords with friends and colleagues.   
I don’t use or create simple passwords (e.g. family name 
and date of birth). 
  
Clean Desk 
I don’t write down my username and password on 
stickers and put them on my desk or attach to the 
computer. 
  
Online Behaviors (Websites) 
I don’t open a link without first verifying where it 
goes. 
  
I don’t click on links that I receive without checking the 
source of the email they came in. 
  
When browsing websites, I don’t click on links, before 
mouseover-ing them to see where they go. 
  
I don’t open links contained in an email even from a 
trusted friend or work colleague without verifying 
where it leads. 
  
I don’t visit a website based on its look and feel, rather 
I look at the URL bar.  
  
I don’t submit information to websites without checking 
their security information/certification. 
  
Software Installation/Updating 
I don’t download applications from an unknown source.   
I don’t download data and material from websites on my 
work computer without checking its authenticity. 
  
When I’m prompted to reboot my computer to initiate a 
software update (the first time), I don’t postpone it.  
  
Remote/Network Access 
I don’t bring my own USB to work in order to transfer 
data onto it even if it is not against the company’s 
policy. 
  
I don’t use free public Wi-Fi for work purposes.    
I don’t use online storage systems to exchange and keep 
personal or sensitive information. (e.g., Dropbox, 
Google Drive) 
  
I don’t store company information on my personal 
electronic device. (e.g., smartphone/laptop, USB) if it 
is not against my company’s policy. 
  
 
Security management practices. Although InfoSec training was found to impact employees’ 
compliance behaviors (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), a lack of managerial practices to follow up and 
monitor employees to ensure that they comply can be a potential security risk. We asked for 
managerial practices like being observed at work. The response was “Besides the initial 
presentation (training) of not to do, I guess if there were no reinforcement, I would never have 
created those habits to ensure security.”  
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Risk propensity. It has been mentioned by some scholars that there might be a relationship 
between risk-taking behaviors and unintentional NISMs (Bureau, 2013). Our data provided support 
for this relationship. We asked about their online behavior like browsing a website. The response 
was: “I don’t look at the URL and usually feel the website. I feel like I have a great radar so far, I 
was lucky, I guess”. We anticipate more factors related to individuals and organizations that link 
to unintentional NISMs. We expect that each of these factors includes sub-constructs that some 




Figure 5.1 Expected causal map 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In order to gain a deep understanding of insiders’ unintentional NISMs, an exploratory qualitative 
study is conducted to determine factors influencing unintentional NISMs. While previous 
100 
 
researchers have provided the conceptual studies to define and propose possible factors, this 
empirical study will shed light on behavioral InfoSec literature and contributes to the context of 
NISMs by identifying significant factors, either organizational or individual, that lead employees 
to commit unintentional NISMs. The results of this study can (1) provide insights to InfoSec 
management in order to modify/implement new strategies in the workplace to reduce the likelihood 
of performing unintentional NISMs, and (2) motivate future researchers to propose experimental 
designs and quantitative studies, to conduct observational research, and to develop theoretical 
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Table 2. A Measurement items and scales 
Techno-overload I am forced by different types of technologies* to work much faster. 
I am forced by different types of technologies to do more work than I can handle. 
I am forced by different types of technologies to work with very tight time 
schedules. 
I am forced to change my work habits to adopt to new technologies. 
I have a higher workload because of increased technology complexity. 
Techno-Invasion  I spend less time with my family due to using different types of technologies. 
I have to be in touch with my work even during my vacation due to using different 
types of technologies 
I have to sacrifice my vacation and weekend time to keep current on new 
technologies.  
I feel my personal life is being invaded by using different types of technologies.  
Techno-Complexity  I don’t know enough about new technologies to handle my job satisfactorily. 
I don’t need to spend time to understand and use new technologies. ** 
I don’t find enough time to study and upgrade my technology skills.  
I find my colleagues know more about technology than I do.  
I often find it too complex for me to understand and use new technologies. 
Techno-Insecurity  I feel constant threat to my job security due to new technologies. 
I have to constantly update my skills to avoid being replaced. ** 
I am threatened by coworkers with newer technology skills.  
I don’t share my knowledge with my coworkers for fear of being replaced. 
I feel there is less sharing knowledge among coworkers for fear of being replaced.  
Techno-Uncertainty  TU1. There are always new developments in technologies we use in our 
organization. 
TU2. There are constant changes in computer software/hardware in our 
organization.  




Due to dependency of my work activities to technology, I cannot do my primary 
work activities when there is a breakdown in systems.  
Due to dependency of my work activities to technology, I cannot do my primary 
work activities when computer speed or response time is slow (e.g., like hitting a 
button and there is a delay until it loads).  
I cannot do my primary work activities due to temporary unavailability of certain 
online services. 
I cannot do my primary work activities due to instability of internet connection.   
Strain I feel drained from activities require me to use technologies.  
I feel tired from my technology-related activities.  
Working all day with different types of technologies is a strain for me.  




Intention to violate 
ISP 
How likely is that you would have done the same as Adam in that situation? (very 
unlikely/very likely).  
I could see myself sharing the password as Adam did. (Strongly disagree/Strongly 
agree) 
Scenario Realism How 
 realistic do you think the scenario is? (Highly Unrealistic-Highly realistic)  
* The term technology refers to any types of day-to-day computer-based applications or IoT devices you 
use, such as automatic scheduling, office automation systems, smart phones, smart watches, application 
development tools, email, smart mailbox, facial recognition system, voice to text devices, etc.). 
** Removed items due to low loading factor (<0.60) 
 
 
Table 2.B Scenarios 
Password-Sharing  
 
Adam is an employee in your organization. One day while Adam is out of the 
office, one of his coworkers needs a file on Adams’ computer. The coworker 
performs similar job functions to Adam’s. The coworker calls Adams and asks 
for his account information. Although Adam knows your organization has a 
policy that password must not be shared, he shares his password with the 
coworker.  
Password Write-Down  John is an employee in your organization. The organization recently installed a 
computer system for managing employee personal information (e.g., employee 
emergency contacts, retirement benefits, salary information). Each employee 
has been given a user name and password for the system. John is aware of the 
company policy stating users are required to keep their passwords to themselves 
and not let other people know or use them. However, finding it difficult to 
remember his password, John wrote it down on a sticky note and attached it to 
the computer he usually uses. 
Failure to Logoff  Jim is an employee in your organization. As part of his job, Jim has been given 
authorised access to the company’s payroll system. One day at work, Jim logs 
into the payroll system to gather information for a weekly report that he 
prepares for management. After some time, Jim needs a restroom break. He is 
aware of the company’s policy that requires users to logoff their computers 
when not in use. However, Jim hates the inconvenience of logging out and 
logging back in again, so he does not log off his computer when he leaves his 
desk to visit the restroom. 
USB Copy 
 
Justin is an employee in your organization and is currently working on a report 
that requires the analysis of sensitive company data. He is extremely busy and 
wants to continue working on the report later that evening at home. Caleb is 
aware of your company’s policy that prohibits users from copying company 
data to portable media, such as USB drives, to avoid security problems. 
However, Caleb copies several company files to his personal, unencrypted USB 
drive so he can work on the report at home. 
Data Leakage  
 
Alex is an employee in the human resources department at your organization 
and thus has been authorised to view the salary information of all employees as 
part of his job functions. Recently, one of Alex’s friends (who does not work for 
your organization) contacted Alex and asked for the salary information of all 
managers in your organization. The friend informed Alex that he was applying 
for a management position in your organization and wanted to use the 
information to determine what salary to ask for in case he is offered the 
position. Although Alex believes providing the salary information is a violation 
of company policy, he looks it up and gives it to the friend. 
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Click on Links 
 
Nathan is an employee in your organization and receives many e-mails every 
day containing links that take him to fill out some forms. One day he receives 
an email from an unknown sender. Even though it is against your organizations’ 
policy to click on links without verifying the source of the email, he clicks on 
the link assuming the email is sent from reliable source. 
 
 
Table 4. A. Measurement items and scales 
Latent 
Variable 
Item Scale (5-Likert) Mean SD 
Curiosity 
(Cur) 
Cur1. I am interested in how my contribution 
impacts the company. 
Cur2. I enjoy developing new strategies. 
Cur3. Regarding practical problems, I’m also 
interested in the underlying causes. 
Cur4. When confronted with complex 
problems, I like to look for new solutions. 
Cur5. I enjoy pondering and thinking. 
Cur6. I am eager to learn new things. 
Cur7. I keep thinking about a problem until I 
solve it. 
Cur8. I challenge already existing concepts 
critically. 
Cur9. I carry on seeking information until I am 
able to understand complex issues. 
Cur 10. I try to improve work processes by    





































Imp1. I plan tasks carefully. (Non-planning) * 
Imp2. I plan trips well ahead of time. (Non-
planning) * 
Imp3. I plan for job security. (Non-planning) * 
Imp4. I am future oriented. (Non-planning) * 
Imp5. I am self-controlled. (Attention)* 
Imp6. I concentrate easily. (Attention)* 
Imp7. I am a careful thinker. (Attention)* 
Imp8. I am a steady thinker. (Attention)* 
Imp9. I don’t pay attention. (Attention)+  
Imp10. I say things without thinking. (Motor) 
+ 
Imp11. I act on impulse. (Motor) + 
Imp12. I do things without thinking (Motor) + 





* All are reverse 
coded items.   
 
+Items for motor 
dimension were 



































Rtb1. I will take risks at work in order to get the 
best results, even though my efforts might 
fail. 
Rtb2. I will take a risk and try something new if 
I have an idea that might improve my 
work, regardless of how I might be 
evaluated. 
Rtb3. When I think of a good way to improve 
the way I accomplish my work, I will risk 
potential failure to try it out. 
Rtb4. I am willing to risk potential failure when 
I have a good idea that could help me 
become more successful. 
Rtb5. I don’t think twice about taking risks in 
my job if I think they will make me more 
productive, regardless of whether or not 
my efforts will be successful. 
Rtb6. Even if failure is a possibility, I will take 
risks on the job if I think they will help me 
reach my goals. 
Rtb7. When I think of a way to increase the 
quality of my work, I will take a risk and 
pursue the idea even though it might not 
pan out. 
Rtb8. In an effort to improve my performance, I 
am willing to take risks with my work, 




















































Isa1. Overall, I am aware of the potential 
information security threats and their 
negative consequences (e.g., personal 
information exposure). 
Isa2. I have sufficient knowledge about the cost 
of potential security problems. 
Isa3. In general, I understand the concerns 
regarding information security and the 
risks they pose. 
Isa4. I know and understand the rules and 
regulations prescribed by the information 
security policy of my organization. 
Isa5. I know my responsibilities as prescribed in 
the information security policy to enhance 

































Pwo1. In my workplace, I feel that the number 
of requests, problems, or complaints I deal 
with is more than expected. 
Pwo2. When I am at work, I feel that the amount 






















Pwo3. In my workplace, I feel busy or rushed. * 







Nism1. I share passwords with friends and 
colleagues. 
Nism 2. I use or create simple passwords (e.g., 
family name and date of birth). 
Nism 3. I use the same password for multiple 
websites. 
Nism 4. I use online storage systems to 
exchange and keep personal or sensitive 
information (e.g., Dropbox, Google 
Drive). 
Nism 5. I submit information to websites 
without checking their security 
information/certification. 
Nism 6. I use free public Wi-Fi. 
Nism 7. I check whether the programs and anti-
virus software that I use are up-to-date.* 
Nism 8. I download applications from an 
unknown source. 
Nism 9. I disable the antivirus on my work 
computer in order to download 
information from websites. 
Nism 10. I download digital media without 
verifying the license of the sources. 
Nism 11. I click on links that I receive without 
checking the source of the email they 
came in. 
Nism 12. I send personal information to others 
over the Internet. 
Nism 13. I open links contained in an email 
from a trusted friend or work colleague 
without verifying where it leads. 
Nism 14. I download data and material from 
websites on my work computer without 
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